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Investigation and presentation of comprehensive life history
mitigation is at the heart of successful capital litigation that has contributed
to a steady decline in capital sentences. Noncapital incarceration rates have
also begun to level, and various legal developments have signaled a re-
ascent of more individualized noncapital sentencing proceedings. This
return to individualized sentencing invites consideration of whether life
history mitigation may, as it has in capital cases, hasten a turn away from
mostly retributive punishment resulting in disproportionately harsh
noncapital sentencing to a more merciful rehabilitative approach. The
robust capital mitigation practice required by today's prevailing
professional capital defense norms developed following the Supreme
Court's Eighth Amendment doctrine requiring individualized capital
sentences that account for the unique characteristics of the offender. No
such doctrinal imperative applies to noncapital sentencing. As a result,
professional noncapital defense sentencing standards, while providing a
general basis for various aspects of sentencing advocacy, remain relatively
underdeveloped, though the same bases for ameliorating punishment in
capital cases should apply with equal practical force to noncapital cases.
At the same time, institutional and doctrinal barriers-including high
caseloads and lack of resources, the prevalence of plea bargaining, and the
Supreme Court's "death is different" precedent-present formidable
challenges to routine presentation of life history mitigation in noncapital
cases. Therefore, the regular presentation of life history mitigation, lacking
a constitutional mandate and operating in a structure different from that of
capital sentencing, will depend in the immediate term on the initiative of
criminal defense lawyers with the will to consistently present it in
noncapital cases. A more widespread adoption of comprehensive
noncapital mitigation practice will benefit individual clients, change the
expectations of sentencing courts concerning what information they should
have available before ordering punishment, and provide insight into the
social causes of various types of crimes. Over time, as it has in capital
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cases, familiarity with the mitigating force of social history may serve as a
powerful basis for empathy and amelioration of overly punitive noncapital
punishment.
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I. Introduction
In a New York Times interview of photographer Dawoud Bey on the
occasion of a retrospective exhibit of his series of 1970s portraits of people
living in Harlem, Bey described the events surrounding the taking of one of
his early portraits-the first one he felt was successful. Bey had walked by
a gentleman wearing an overcoat and a bowler hat and decided he wanted to
take the man's picture. The man agreed, and Bey asked him to do what he
had been doing before Bey interrupted him. Bey wanted his portraits to
capture "natural" scenes of "people living their lives."' The man then
*Senior Attorney, Federal Capital Habeas Project; Visiting Assistant Professor at Columbia Law School,
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leaned against the railing of the brick house in front of which he had been
standing and "cupped his left hand, providing what Bey calls a 'grace
note."' 2 Bey went on to explain that although he had figured out some of
the technical aspects of artistic photography, "I needed the quirky little
gestures of behavior that mark the individual, the stuff you can't make up. I
needed a way to create a momentary connection that would leave viewers
feeling they knew this person."3
The "grace note" that Bey described is akin to the sentencing grail
that lawyers representing capital defendants have a duty to discover and
present to those who decide whether their clients live or die.4  It is the
peculiaritys that individualizes clients and forces a closer look at their
humanity in all its complexity, including the "diverse frailties of
humankind" that the Supreme Court has long recognized as central to a
capital sentencer's consideration of a defendant's moral culpability.6
Unlike a static snapshot of a single moment in time, capital defense
lawyers' work requires discovery and detailed presentation of life history-
including the social, medical, economic, and historical dynamics that shape
every person's behavior. In sentencing, the grace note requires a deeper
moral and less fleeting engagement with the person, a beholding that calls
forth empathy, mercy, and redemption, more than the momentary
connection Bey inspired in his photograph.
The grace notes that capital defense lawyers have presented as
characterizing their clients' backgrounds have in innumerable cases spared
Spring 2013; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1997; B.A., Columbia University, 1994. Many thanks to the
following colleagues for their insightful comments and feedback on this project: Brett Dignam, Ariela
Dubler, James Forman, Heather Gerken, Olati Johnson, Marcus McFerren, Tracey Meares, Linda
Meyer, Ronald Resetarits, Daniel Richman, Sarah Russell, Carol Steiker, and Russell Stetler. Thanks
also to participants in the University of Texas Law School's Symposium on Mass Incarceration and the
Death Penalty (March 2013), to the editors of the American Journal of Criminal Law, and to Andrea
McChristian for enthusiastic and able research assistance.
1. Gwenda Blair, '70s Portrait of Harlem, Gathered For Today, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, at




4. This is true given that one meaning of "grace" is synonymous with "mercy." The late
Professor William J. Stuntz wrote eloquently about the impact of grace as a foundation for effective
crime policy. See William J. Stuntz, Law and Grace, 98 VA. L. REv. 367, 367-77 (2012) ("Grace and
mercy and relationship are transformative, and that truth has practical value for people who think about
law, politics, and government.").
5. As discussed infra, there is unfortunately nothing peculiar about the poverty, trauma, mental
illness, and racism with which many capital clients live. Yet, the ways in which these social factors
impact each person differ. See Mark E. Olive & Russell Stetler, Using the Supplementary Guidelines
for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases to Change the Picture in
Postconviction, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1067, 1069 (2008). Explanation of the effect of these forces on a
client's functioning and behavior is at the heart of a capital defense team's work. See Craig Haney, The
Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 547, 592-94 (1995) [hereinafter Haney, Social Context].
6. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 247 n.8 (2007) (quoting Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
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them the death penalty.7 In each case, grace depends on the investigation
and presentation of mitigation: a persuasive description of the forces that
shape human behavior and that, in some instances, explain behavior that
violates law.
At least two normative judgments and one mixed normative-
descriptive judgment underlie the arguments presented here. First,
individualized, offender-focused sentencing is fairer than uniform, offense-
based sentencing. Second, social history evidence of a person's
disadvantaged background is relevant to his moral culpability. Third,
rehabilitation and offender-focused punishment will be both fairer and more
likely to lead to effective crime reduction policy because mitigation will
help identify the factors that influence people to engage in behavior that
breaks the law. This paper offers arguments in support of all three
assumptions.
Consideration of wide-ranging facets of a person's background is
elementary to fair and proportionate sentencing. In fact, individualization
in sentencing has historically been a core value, in rhetoric if not always in
practice. Supreme Court precedent has certainly constitutionalized this
principle in capital cases, but the ascent of determinate and guidelines-
based noncapital sentencing has obscured the value of individualization in
routine criminal cases. The death penalty's doctrinal exceptionalism,
among other institutional barriers, has deterred comprehensive mitigation
presentations in noncapital sentencing as lawyers and noncapital sentencing
courts focused on literally calculating sentences.
Notwithstanding the doctrinal and institutional hurdles that have
diminished the investigation of life history mitigation in noncapital cases,
this paper argues there is simply no principled reason that the same
circumstances that courts have recognized narrow opportunity and distort
the lives of people charged with capital crimes should not be presented to
courts sentencing people for lesser offenses. Moreover, in a departure from
the last few decades' emphasis on determinate sentencing, recent Supreme
7. See Mark E. Olive, Narrative Works, 77 UMKC L. REv. 989 (2009) (summarizing three
habeas grants of capital sentencing relief based on life history mitigation that was not presented at trial).
I won habeas relief in one of the three cases, that of Herbert Williams, Jr., who had been sentenced to
death in Alabama. Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326 (1lth Cir. 2008). See Russell Stetler, The Mystery
of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a Reasoned Moral Response in Capital Sentencing, 11 U. PA.
J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 237, 238 (2007-2008) (citing the cases of "beltway sniper" Lee Boyd Malvo, 9/11
hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui, and Oklahoma City bomber Terry Nichols as three infamous cases that
resulted in life verdicts); see Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 6,
2003, for a detailed discussion of the capital mitigation resulting in a life sentence for Jeremy Gross,
who at eighteen robbed and shot to death a convenience store clerk, and including the following
information: the crime was videotaped, guilt was not at issue, an Indiana jury saw the crime video, and
nevertheless the jury sentenced Gross to life after hearing details of his neglectful and abusive
childhood. See also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Entrenchment and/or Destabilization?
Reflections on (Another) Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 30 LAW &
INEQ. 211, 233 (2012) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Entrenchment] (explaining that "extensive
mitigation cases . . . reflect the new reality that no crimes, no matter their severity, are invariably
punished by death").
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Court decisions have revitalized individualization in noncapital sentencing
and made more room for meaningful mitigation presentations in noncapital
cases.' Given this opportunity for individualized sentencing to return to the
fore, defense lawyers should be doing a great deal more mitigation work.
The time has come for noncapital defense lawyers to chart a course toward
meaningful individualization by routinely putting life history mitigation at
the center of sentencing. There are plenty of better noncapital sentencing
practices than the current model that prevails. Capital practice norms can
serve as a model, and institutions such as holistic defender offices and law
school clinics are particularly well-situated to lead the way.
II. Context, Implications, and Overview
This reflection comes at a time when sentencing trends that even a
few years ago seemed intractable appear to be giving way to a more
merciful approach to punishment. The number of death sentences is falling
historically and dramatically9 and, for the first time in forty years, the
incarceration rate is leveling and, in some states, declining.1o Yet,
exploration of what might facilitate or accelerate the drop in incarceration
rates has, in many respects, remained obscured by capital cases' outsized
place in criminal justice practice and policy and in discourse about crime
and punishment." Reasons for the attention devoted to capital cases
include the unparalleled gravity and irreversibility of the death penalty and
the incalculable human rights impact of the United States' singular
commitment to capital punishment among Western democracies. However,
the fact remains that the vast majority of criminal defendants are in prison
for noncapital crimes, and many are facing prison terms that in regimes
without capital punishment would stand out as their own human rights
violations.12 In 2011, there were 43 executions and 3,251 people on death
8. See infra notes 91, 93-96 and accompanying text.
9. 2011 marked the first time since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976 that there were fewer
than 100 new death sentences annually. See The Death Penalty in 2011: Year End Report, DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (2011) [hereinafter DPIC Report]. See also Ethan Bronner, Use of
Death Sentences Continues to Fall In US, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2012, at A24 (reporting that in 2012
there were eighty death sentences, one third the number reported in 2000).
10. David Cole, Turning The Corner On Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 29
(2011).
11. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The Effect of
Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More Broadly, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 155, 190 (2008) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Opening a Window].
12. This is particularly true of life without parole (LWOP) sentences, which are often adopted by
death penalty advocates as a means of reducing the likelihood of death sentences, but which are rarely
imposed in many other parts of the world. In the absence of capital punishment, LWOP would be a very
viable target of human rights campaigns and Eighth Amendment litigation. See Steiker & Steiker,
Entrenchment, supra note 7, at 234. In fact, reduction in death sentences is often linked to the
availability of life without parole as an alternative, which is a cardinal example of the ways in which
maintenance of the death penalty promotes draconian criminal punishment broadly. See Steiker &
Steiker, Opening a Window, supra note 11, at 176-77; Aman Batheja, Texas Sends Fewer to Death
Row, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 28, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-1 1-
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row;13 in 2010, by comparison, there were 2.3 million people in U.S.
prisons and jails, with all but approximately 3,200 of them serving
noncapital sentences.14  As the death penalty appears to be falling out of
favor," there is hope that incarceration rates are also waning. It is
worthwhile to consider how the work that has contributed to capital
punishment's decline might be deployed to ameliorate noncapital penalties.
Effective presentation of capital mitigation has both changed sentencers'
perceptions of individual defendants and recalibrated prevailing views of
criminality as a product of individual poor choices rather than the range of
social factors that influence human behavior.' 6
The same circumstances that impact many capital defendants'
lives-including poverty, untreated or self-treated mental illness, addiction,
and trauma-also affect many noncapital defendants' lives.' 7 Yet, there is
no constitutional imperative that noncapital defendants' sentencers hear
evidence that the Supreme Court has recognized as central to "assessing a
defendant's moral culpability."' 8  A person convicted of a noncapital crime
has no right to have his sentencer consider his individual circumstances in
28/news/0911280167_1_death-sentences-death-row-juries (citing prosecutors and defense attorneys as
identifying "the biggest game changer" in Texas' death penalty rates as the introduction of life without
parole in 2005). From another vantage point, the death penalty leads to "sentence inflation" so that if
the most aggravated homicides are punishable by death, then lesser, but still quite serious, crimes must
be punishable by the next harshest penalty available: LWOP. See also Cole, supra note 10, at 41
("Today, one out of eleven [American] sentences being served is a life sentence. For the same types of
crimes, American sentences are roughly twice as long as those in the United Kingdom, four times longer
than those meted out by the Dutch, five times longer than those in Sweden, and five to ten times longer
than those imposed in France."). There have been successful Supreme Court challenges to the
application of LWOP to juveniles, particularly very young teenagers, but no similar challenges to
LWOP's constitutionality for adult offenders. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012);
Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 1733 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
13. DPIC Report, supra note 9.
14. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. CORRECTIONAL POPULATION DECLINED FOR SECOND
CONSECUTIVE YEAR (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/pl0cpusl0pr.cfm.
15. A 2012 ballot referendum to abolish the death penalty in California lost by about six
percentage points. Howard Mintz & Matt O'Brien, Proposition 34: Death Penalty Repeal Fails, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.mercurynews.com/elections/ci_21943752/califomia-
proposition-34-voters-decide-whether-keep-states.
16. See Haney, Social Context, supra note 5, at 561-62 ("Capital penalty trials ... and what they
tell us about the roots of violence . .. can . . . serve as the basis for development of a responsible social
policy of violence prevention . . . ."). See also Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking across the
Empathic Divide: Racialized Decision Making on the Capital Jury, MICH. ST. L. REV. 573, 590 (2011);
Stetler, supra note 7, at 264 (describing mitigation as having a purpose outside the courtroom as "an
archive for future historians, social scientists, and public health researchers who will look for the causes
of the homicide levels in twenty-first century America. . . .").
17. Stetler, supra note 7 and text accompanying notes 7, 16 (describing studies documenting the
prevalence of mental illness among capital and noncapital prisoners). It is also entirely possible that the
degrees or types of mental illness, trauma, addiction, and other prototypical capital mitigation are simply
not as prevalent among noncapital offenders. One implication of pushing for more investigation and
presentation of whatever mitigation is present in noncapital cases is the accrual of a record of the social
circumstances that actually do contribute to noncapital crime. Another research project might center on
identifying and distinguishing the social histories of some set of noncapital defendants from those of
capital defendants.
18. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 512 (2003).
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mitigation.'9 As a result, thousands of people are sentenced to thousands of
years of prison annually by judges who know very little, if anything, about
their backgrounds, including factors that should be considered in any just
assessment of their blameworthiness. Given the doctrinal barriers to
successful postconviction proportionality challenges of long prison
sentences, 20 accounting for all possible mitigating factors at the outset of
sentencing is the best hope for stemming overly harsh punishment. 2 1
Institutional change in defense sentencing advocacy is a logical next step.
A good deal has been written about mitigation in capital
sentencing 22 as well as the merits of individualized noncapital sentencing. 23
Articles have also examined reasons and presented proposals to explain
declining incarceration rates24 and compared implications of capital and
noncapital Eighth Amendment doctrine.25 Other scholarship has considered
the contours of Sixth Amendment challenges to defense representation at
noncapital sentencing. 26 This paper touches on these areas and proposes
something new:27 One way of accelerating the decline in incarceration rates
19. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 956, 994-95 (1991). Harmelin-which challenged a
mandatory life without parole sentence imposed on a first-time felony offender convicted of possessing
672 grams of cocaine-is an Eighth Amendment case decided mostly on proportionality grounds.
Professor Rachel Barkow has criticized the Supreme Court's proportionality doctrine in noncapital
sentencing, which is not the focus of this article. See Rachel Barkow, The Court ofLife and Death: The
Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and The Case For Uniformity, 107 MIcH. L. REv. 1145,
1155-62 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court is not as robust in its proportionality review of
noncapital sentences as it is with capital sentences). Mitigation concerning a defendant's life
circumstances, including those that influenced his behavior leading up to criminal charges, is certainly
relevant to the Supreme Court's threshold proportionality test for noncapital sentences which asks
whether "the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime" and will uphold a sentence "as long as
the state has a 'reasonable basis for believing' that it will serve either deterrent, retributive,
rehabilitative, or incapacitative goals." Id. at 1156-57 (quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28
(2003)). One can hardly determine whether a prosecutor's belief that a sentence will meet one of those
enumerated penological goals is reasonable without knowing anything about the individual who will be
serving that sentence.
20. See Steiker & Steiker, Opening a Window, supra note 11, at 186-87 (discussing Harmelin,
501 U.S. 957).
21. See Barkow, supra note 19, at 1155-62 (noting that the United States Supreme Court
upholds seemingly disproportionate sentences in noncapital cases if the state has a reasonable belief that
such a sentence will advance a "deterrent, retributive, rehabilitative, or incapacitative goal").
22. See, e.g., Haney, Social Context, supra note 5, at 589-90; Stetler, supra note 7, at 238;
Kathleen Wayland, The Importance of Recognizing Trauma Throughout Capital Mitigation
Investigations and Presentations, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 923, 926-28 (2008).
23. See, e.g., Craig Haney, Politicizing Crime and Punishment: Redefining "Justice" to Fight
the "War on Prisoners, " 114 W. VA. L. REv. 373, 384-85 (2012) [hereinafter Haney, War on
Prisoners]; Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Legislatures, Judges, and Parole Boards: The Allocation of
Discretion under Determinate Sentencing, 62 FLA. L. REv. 1037, 1050 (2010); Barkow, supra note 19
at 1155-62.
24. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 10, at 34-43; Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice:
The Future ofPenal Law, 90 N. C. L. REV. 581, 583-86 (2012).
25. See Fan, supra note 24, at 608-10; Barkow, supra note 19.
26. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance At Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069,
1072 (2009).
27. The survey of professional noncapital sentencing guidelines discussed infra Part IV is also a
new contribution to scholarship on sentencing and lawyers' professional and ethical obligations to their
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is to make the kind of mitigation that has contributed to the unprecedented
reduction in capital sentences central to noncapital sentencing as a means of
preventing and challenging excessively punitive sentences.28 Professor
David Cole has suggested that an "empathy gap" that arises from the failure
of most Americans to have much concern about the lives of those behind
bars is one of the biggest challenges to increasing public will for
meaningful prison reform.2 9 This article urges noncapital defense lawyers
to provide a factual basis for bridging that gap so that sentencers pay closer
attention to the human beings whose lives they are being asked to shut
away.
Increased emphasis on mitigation will certainly stand to benefit
individual defendants. In addition, meaningful mitigation presentations
have the collective potential to establish a record of the reasons people
engage in criminal behavior, as these presentations have done in capital
cases. 30 That record stands to alter the balance of our understanding of the
root causes of crime and to diminish the appetite for unduly harsh
punishment.3 1
Proposing that mitigation play a central role in noncapital
sentencing implicates a number of complex issues, some of which this
paper touches on and some of which are outside its scope. The biggest
implication is the Supreme Court's general rejection of Eighth Amendment
challenges to noncapital sentencing.32 Resources are a second difficult
implication, and this paper presents reasons for institutional defender
offices to direct resources to develop or strengthen the mitigation practice
as well as for foundations and public funding sources to support this work.
Holistic public defender offices have been leading the charge in
incorporating social workers into their sentencing work and can continue to
serve as training centers and models for other practices. 33  Law school
clinics are another prospective source of talent and an important incubator
for future lawyers and judges trained in high quality noncapital sentencing
advocacy. However, the focus on defenders does not address another
difficult institutional issue: the widespread cost of individualized sentencing
clients.
28. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 1733 (2012);
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567-69 (2005). One scholar
has proposed that sentencers should consider the fact of mass incarceration itself a mitigating factor.
See, e.g., Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. (No. 2) 423, 458 (2013).
29. See Cole, supra note 10, at 40.
30. This is another idea I do not have the space to consider here, but that could certainly be the
basis of future research and scholarship. It is also an area that would lend itself well to collaboration
with a law school clinic where students would provide direct representation and collect data on
mitigating factors that could be reported and used to advocate for non-incarceration dispositions and
support for social services addressing issues that recur in sentencing. As discussed infra, this approach
would work particularly well in a neighborhood-based office where social problems are concentrated
and service agencies are in close proximity.
31. See Haney, Social Context, supra note 5, at 608.
32. See discussion infra Part V.C.
33. See infra text accompanying note 178.
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on other actors in the justice system, specifically judges and prosecutors.
Certainly, more robust defense sentencing presentations will take more time
to consider and rebut and will impact judicial and prosecutorial dockets.
On the other hand, the high fiscal and incalculable social cost of overly
harsh incarceration is well-documented, and this proposal seeks to lessen
that institutional toll.
A third implication involves changes to the professional guidelines
for noncapital sentencing practice, which, as described in Part IV, call for
basic mitigation presentations. These presentations are a far cry from the
specific and layered exhortations of the capital guidelines. One reason for
the prescriptive focus here on defense lawyers, as opposed to courts or
legislatures, is that defense lawyers with adequate resources have the power
to work immediately toward bringing about fundamental changes in each of
the areas implicated. With a coordinated strategy, defenders can challenge
noncapital constitutional doctrine, as they have successfully in Miller v.
Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, discussed infra. Defenders also have the
capacity, demonstrated over years of capital practice, to align their
professional guidelines with advocacy that brings about more proportional
and just sentencing. A fourth implication is reform of mandatory or
determinate sentencing schemes that by design exclude consideration of any
individual circumstances.3 4
Another acknowledgment: much of the discussion herein centers on
federal cases simply because the United States presents a single
jurisdictional case study reflecting sentencing trends also seen in many
states.3 5 Surveying state statutes and practice is beyond the scope of this
project. However, the proposals here for changes in defense sentencing
practice are meant for defense lawyers in all jurisdictions, particularly given
that the vast majority of sentences are imposed by state courts.
Finally, this paper is not advocating blurring the line between
capital and noncapital cases, ratcheting down the standard of death penalty
practice, or diminishing procedural and substantive safeguards applicable to
capital litigation. To the contrary, the suggestion here is that if there is a
single area in which decades of death penalty law and practice might help
noncapital defendants, it is by raising the bar and aligning noncapital
mitigation practice with the highest standards of the legal profession
developed by capital defense teams.
The next part of this paper provides a brief review of the evolution
of capital mitigation, including the development of rigorous professional
norms for competent representation following Eighth Amendment doctrine
34. See Haney, War on Prisoners, supra note 23, at 375, 385 (noting that "nothing else beyond
the 'seriousness of the offense' was thought to matter to the fairness of the sentence"); see also
Dharmapala et al., supra note 23, at 1043-44.
35. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two
Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65 (2009) (summarizing research on mandatory
sentencing laws, with a specific focus on laws in the U.S.).
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requiring individualized capital sentencing. Part IV will review the existing
professional guidelines for the investigation and presentation of mitigation
in noncapital cases, which are less specific than the capital guidelines but
establish the elementary steps a defense attorney must take to provide
competent sentencing advocacy. Part V presents some of the institutional
and doctrinal barriers to more robust noncapital mitigation. This section
also explains why in light of these barriers, especially the Supreme Court's
adherence to the "death is different" doctrine, noncapital defense attorneys
must seize the initiative to improve their mitigation practices and thereby
contribute to the paradigmatic shift toward more rehabilitative,
individualized noncapital sentencing. This shift hopefully will result in
more proportional sentences and fewer and shorter prison terms.
The paper concludes with a case illustrating the inherent value in
putting a client's history into the record of an official tribunal before she
becomes yet another incarceration statistic, particularly when the client's
criminal involvement is, as is often the case, attributable at least as much to
social institutional failures as it is to her individual choice to commit crime.
In this way, the work capital litigators do to inspire mercy can be applied to
noncapital cases to adjust sentencers' views of defendants' moral
culpability and to prevent unduly harsh punishment.
III. The Development of Mitigation as the Crux of Capital Sentencing
A. A Brief Review of Foundational Supreme Court Eighth Amendment
Precedent in Capital Cases
In the years after the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
capital statutes requiring "guided discretion," 3 6 the Court decided the cases
that laid the foundation of modern capital litigation, including the
investigation and presentation of mitigating factors to provide a basis for
life sentences.37 These cases set forth the minimum Eighth Amendment
considerations required of sentencers deciding whether to condemn a
person to die. First, in striking down North Carolina's mandatory death
penalty for first-degree murder, the Court identified one of the state
statute's constitutional shortcomings as "its failure to allow the
particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record
of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence
of death."38 Two years later, the Court held in Lockett v. Ohio that the
36. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Four years before Gregg, in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court found that all the capital statutes then in place allowed capital
sentencers unfettered discretion in deciding which defendants would be sentenced to death. The Court
held that unguided discretion violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, thus halting all
executions until the Court decided Gregg. The modem era of capital punishment, including the
development of bifurcated capital trials with a guilt phase and a separate penalty phase, followed Gregg.
37. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
38. Woodron, 428 U.S. at 303.
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Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that capital sentencers "not be
precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."39 The
Supreme Court refined its description of mitigating circumstances in
Eddings v. Oklahoma, reversing the Oklahoma court for failing to consider
evidence of Eddings' life history as mitigation because, in the Oklahoma
court's view, the evidence "did not tend to provide a legal excuse from
criminal responsibility." 4 0 The Court held that in a capital case, courts may
not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence. 4 1
Eddings had offered evidence of his youth, of "a difficult family history and
of emotional disturbance," which was, even by that relatively early time
following the reinstatement of the death penalty, "typically introduced by
defendants in mitigation." 42  The Court held that "the background and
mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant [must] be duly
considered in sentencing," 43 and scores of cases since Eddings have made
plain that, regardless of the defendant's age at the time of the offense, his
social history and mental conditions are textbook mitigation. 44 Post-offense
good conduct is also relevant,45 and will be particularly relevant in
noncapital cases where redemption and prospects for rehabilitation are
central sentencing considerations.
These baseline cases establish that capital sentencers must have an
opportunity to give-and are required to give-"full consideration of evidence
that mitigates against the death penalty [in order to] give a reasoned moral
response to the defendant's background, character, and crime." 46
B. A Brief Review of Supreme Court Sixth Amendment Precedent in
Capital Cases
Following these Eighth Amendment cases, leading capital defense
lawyers' practices evolved to emphasize investigation and presentation of
wide ranging social history mitigation. Post-Lockett, competent capital
defense practice depended on finding evidence that explained defendants'
39. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis in original).
40. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113.
41. Id. at 114.
42. Id. at 115.
43. He was sixteen at the time of the crime. Id. at 116.
44. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 245 (2007) (holding that the trial court erred
in not permitting the sentencing jury to consider mitigating evidence, such as petitioner's troubled
childhood); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) (finding that evidence of impaired intellectual
functioning is inherently mitigating); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535 (2003) (holding that defense
counsel failed to meet professional standards by not presenting mitigating evidence of defendant's
troubled history at trial); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (taking into consideration
defendant's mental retardation and abused background).
45. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
46. Penry, 492 U.S. at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
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actions and described the factors that influenced their behavior. After this
shift in capital defense practice took hold, the professional guidelines
governing that practice began to reflect the new emphasis on mitigation.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, in the wake of these evolving professional norms,
the next wave of Supreme Court capital mitigation cases pertained to capital
defense lawyers' Sixth Amendment duty of competent representation. A
trio of decisions from the early 2000s set forth the constitutional standards
required of capital defense lawyers at sentencing. Williams v. Taylor,47
Wiggins v. Smith,4 8 and Rompilla v. Beard9 underscored the breadth of
available capital mitigation and counsel's duty to investigate and present a
social history in order to provide juries and judges with the information
they need to make a decision guided by the "reasoned moral response"
required by Woodson, Lockett, and Eddings.s0 Williams, Wiggins, and
Rompilla also made plain that capital defendants' "excruciating life
histor[ies]"51 had moved members of the Court to decide that those histories
warranted sentencing relief even in cases involving unspeakable offenses. 52
For example, the Williams Court provided in a footnote a textured glimpse
into Williams' squalid early life, including his experience of being left
naked in a house with standing urine in the bedrooms and human excrement
on the floors by parents too drunk to find clothes to dress him:
The home was a complete wreck .... There were several places
on the floor where someone had had a bowel movement. Urine
was standing in several places in the bedrooms. There were dirty
dishes scattered over the kitchen, and it was impossible to step
any place on the kitchen floor where there was no trash .... The
children were all dirty and none of them had on under-pants.
Noah and Lula were so intoxicated, they could not find any
clothes for the children, nor were they able to put the clothes on
them . . . . The children had to be put in Winslow Hospital, as
four of them, by that time, were definitely under the influence of
whiskey.53
Details were provided through unassailable documentary evidence and were
47. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
48. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
49. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
50. See also Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 264-65 (2007).
51. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003).
52. See e.g. Olive & Stetler, supra note 5, at 1069 (describing Terry Williams killing of a drunk
man by beating his chest and back with a garden tool and stealing three dollars from the victim's wallet
leaving him gasping for breath; assaulting two elderly women after this murder and leaving one in a
vegetative state; and setting his jail cell afire while being held before his capital trial); Id. at 1071
(describing Kevin Wiggins driving the car and pawning the belongings of the drowned seventy-seven-
year-old victim whose apartment he had robbed); Id at 1072 (describing Ronald Rompilla's victim as
having been stabbed multiple times, including sixteen wounds to his head and neck, beaten with a blunt
object, left dead in a pool of his own blood, and set on fire).
53. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 n.19 (2000) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
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likely outside the memories of any of those present at the time. That
indelible portrait was at the heart of the Supreme Court's grant of
sentencing relief.54  Similarly, in Wiggins the postconviction record
reflected, among other horrors, that Wiggins had suffered severe physical
and sexual abuse in a series of foster homes and at the hands of his sadistic
alcoholic mother, who left him and his siblings "alone for days with nothing
to eat, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips and garbage."ss
And in Rompilla, the postconviction record included the following
evidence: Rompilla's father would lock Rompilla and his brother in an
excrement-filled dog pen; his mother drank while she was pregnant with
him; his father beat Rompilla severely with his hands, fists, leather straps,
belts, and sticks; the family had no indoor plumbing; the children slept in an
attic with no heat and went to school filthy and in rags; and that Rompilla
suffered from organic brain damage and from an "IQ in the mentally
retarded range."56
These details of the particular terrors endured long before these
people became capital defendants are seared into the memories of anyone
who has read their cases. It is not just that these children were neglected or
abused. It is that they were left with nothing to eat but garbage and paint
chips; that they were brutalized with leather straps, belts, and sticks; and
that they were housed alongside human and canine waste.57 Persuaded by
these documented atrocities on the lives of children who grew up to be
involved in capital offenses, the Supreme Court in Williams, Wiggins, and
54. Id at 395.
[Trial counsel] failed to conduct an investigation that would have uncovered
extensive records graphically describing Williams' nightmarish childhood, not
because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly thought that state
law barred access to such records. Had they done so, the jury would have learned
that Williams' parents had been imprisoned for the criminal neglect of Williams
and his siblings, that Williams had been severely and repeatedly beaten by his
father, that he had been committed to the custody of the social services bureau for
two years during his parents' incarceration (including one stint in an abusive
foster home), and then, after his parents were released from prison, had been
returned to his parents' custody.
Id.
55. Olive & Stetler, supra note 5, at 1071.
56. Olive & Stetler, supra note 5, at 1072-73 (internal quotations omitted).
57. There are scores of lower court habeas decisions recounting brutal life histories that have
been bases of capital habeas relief. For a few powerful examples, see Olive, supra note 7, at 10, 19-21.
Herbert Williams, Jr., for example, endured a childhood full of terror and suffered beatings so severe
that his bone was exposed. See Williams, 542 F.3d at 1334. The circuit court relayed additional details
of Williams' trauma. His father broke a chair over his head at age seventeen. Id. at 1333. He watched
as his father threw his two-year-old brother against a wall with such force that his brother did not speak
again for over three years. Id. at 1332. His mother participated in his father's brutality, and both parents
neglected Williams' most basic needs. Id. at 1334. He did not learn that people brushed their teeth daily
until he was incarcerated for his capital offense. Id. at 1334. Abusive and impoverished childhoods are
unfortunately far from unique in the lives of capital defendants or prisoners. The details of each
person's social history are the elements of successful mitigation. General statements about trauma and
poverty are no substitute for these credible narratives offering views into the forces that shaped the lives
of people later tried or convicted for capital homicides.
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Rompilla made unequivocal capital trial counsel's duty to develop and
present social history mitigation, using prevailing professional norms as a
touchstone for whether counsel's performance met the appropriate standard
of care." A review of the evolution of those norms follows.
C. Development of Mitigation as Standard Capital Defense Practice
Once the Supreme Court made clear that the presentation and
consideration of mitigation must be a part of any constitutionally
permissible capital trial, lawyers defending capital clients set about the task
of identifying the factors that would humanize their clients, explain their
behavior, and give judges and juries a reason to sentence them to life. 9
Successful presentation of mitigation requires going outside the relatively
narrow categories of mitigation prescribed by many capital statutes, and
instead speaking of the "diverse frailties of humankind" as the source of
mercy.6 0 Mitigation should inspire recognition of common humanity and
bridge the divides between an indigent person presumed to be a deranged,
inscrutable killer, and the good citizens who sit in judgment of him.61
Mitigation includes "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death." 62
With this definition of mitigation firmly established, intrepid and
creative capital defense lawyers63 nationwide set about unearthing and
presenting a credible narrative of the factors that landed the client before the
sentencer choosing life or death."4 Capital defense lawyers began to work
with investigators 65 whose sole responsibility was to uncover evidence of
58. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (calling the ABA Guidelines "well-defined
norms"); see also Olive & Stetler, supra note 5, at 1074-75 (discussing the Supreme Court's use of the
Guidelines in recognizing capital counsel's "long-recognized 'obligations' and the parameters of
attorney 'diligence').
59. Stetler, supra note 7, at 237-38.
60. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
61. As Russell Stetler, a leading light among mitigation specialists, has written:
The diverse frailties bestow the kinship of humanity. We all have them, to
varying degrees, but, for most of us, the protective supports of family and
society along with our individual strengths offset those frailties. For many
capital clients, the frailties are overwhelming, and the supports are absent.
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence confers compensatory protection to allow
life-and-death decision makers to extend compassion on an individual basis.
Stetler, supra note 7, at 241.
62. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (internal citation omitted).
63. See, e.g., Sean D. O'Brien, Capital Defense Lawyers: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 105
MICH. L. REv. 1067 (2007) (reviewing Professor Welsh S. White, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF
DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES (2006)).
64. See O'Brien, supra note 63, at 1081-82 (emphasizing that "the capital defense bar will
always reach out for help and advice from multiple sources" "to unearth sources of human compassion
in their cases").
65. See Stetler, supra note 7, at 248-54 (providing a history of the introduction of mitigation
specialists into capital defense teams).
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disabilities, mental conditions, and social influences that served as "a basis
for compassion-not an excuse." 66 These "mitigation specialists" became
essential members of capital defense teams."7 The mitigation specialist's
role is to compile a comprehensive social history and identify mitigating
themes. Mitigation specialists also assist counsel in locating appropriate
experts and providing the defendant's social history data to allow the
experts to reliably evaluate the client. Counsel, the mitigation specialist,
and the experts then work together to develop a comprehensive case for
mercy.68 As a consequence of the Supreme Court's post-Furman Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, even the most death-prone jurisdictions came to
expect this socio-legal data known as mitigation in capital proceedings.
After capital defense lawyers had some time to develop that new
baseline standard of practice meeting the requirements of Lockett, Eddings.
and related cases, written professional guidelines coalesced and reflected
the work capital defense teams were doing to put together life-saving,
credible portraits for mercy and to guide more lawyers to raise their level of
practice to meet basic standards. 69 In 1989, the American Bar Association
(ABA) first published the Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.7 0 Fourteen years later, in 2003, the
ABA revised the guidelines to take into account intervening legal
developments and "to provide specific guidance to remedy some of the
most serious mistakes made by counsel and other actors in the criminal
justice system." 71 In particular, the 2003 Guidelines reflected the Supreme
Court's emphasis on individualized capital sentencing 72 and crystallized the
corresponding professional obligation to employ mitigation specialists at all
66. Id. at 262.
67. Id at 250.
68. Id. at 245 (citing American Bar Association, American Bar Association Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913,
959 (2003)).
69. The ABA Guidelines' history makes clear that the professional standards have both reflected
the most competent capital representation being contemporaneously provided and served as an
aspirational beacon for lawyers falling short of that standard. See also Olive & Stetler, supra note 5, at
n.39 ("The Supreme Court has consistently used the ABA's standards and guidelines in capital cases to
assess the performance of trial counsel who prepared their eases [sic] before the relevant ABA
publications had been issued.") (internal citation omitted).
70. See Robin M. Maher, The ABA and the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation
Function ofDefense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 766 (2008).
71. Id. In the years immediately preceding adoption of the ABA Guidelines, two Supreme Court
justices-Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsburg-had also expressed concern about the quality of
defense representation in capital cases making their way to the high court. Brian Bakst, O'Connor Says
There Are "Serious Questions" About Fairness of The Death Penalty, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 3, 2001)
http://lubbockonline.com/stories/070301/upd_075-4394.shtml; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate
Justice, United States Supreme Court, Address at U.D.C. School of Law (Apr. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp 04-09-01a.html
(Justice Ginsburg opining in a speech at the University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke
School of Law that she had yet to see a capital case in which the defendant was well-represented at
trial).
72. Maher, supra note 70, at 767.
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stages of death penalty litigation.73 They also required jurisdictions to
provide funding for the defense to hire a mitigation specialist in every
case.74
In the years following the 2003 Guidelines, lawyers and mitigation
specialists nationwide developed the Supplementary Guidelines for the
Mitigation Function ofDefense Teams in Death Penalty Cases to define the
nature and scope of mitigation and the qualifications and training of
mitigation specialists. 75  The Supplementary Guidelines are organized to
correspond to the ABA Guidelines and make clear that counsel has the
ultimate responsibility for putting together a team that has the skills and
tools necessary to provide the client with a comprehensive mitigation
investigation. 76
This history of the development of high-quality capital mitigation
standards may be instructive for development of similar norms in
noncapital cases. However, there remains a major distinction between the
trajectory of capital defense mitigation and noncapital defense mitigation:
the former developed in response to the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment precedent requiring capital sentencing to include meaningful
consideration of life history mitigation. No such doctrine applies to
noncapital sentencing, so there is no corresponding constitutional mandate
for noncapital defense attorneys to pursue mitigation. The one noncapital
exception derives from the Supreme Court's holdings in Miller v. Alabama
and Jackson v. Hobbs.77 Those cases held that mandatory life without
parole sentencing of juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment and that
individualized sentencing, including consideration of social histories, is
required for all juvenile offenders.7 8 The Miller/Jackson cases, the first to
extend the requirement of individualized sentencing to noncapital cases,
have provided a limited79 opening for investigation and presentation of
robust noncapital mitigation. In fact, efforts are underway to provide
mitigation training for the lawyers who will represent clients receiving
resentencing hearings under Miller/Jackson. Yet, outside juvenile cases, in
73. Id. at 770 (citing ABA Guideline 4.1).
74. Id. (citing ABA Guideline 9.1).
75. Though these standards were not developed by the ABA, the organization's Death Penalty
Representation Project welcomed them as a "valuable elaboration of the principles embodied in the
black-letter ABA Guidelines." Stetler, supra note 7, at 263; see Maher, supra note 70, at 770
(describing the Supplementary Guidelines as a "natural and complementary extension of the ABA
Guidelines").
76. Stetler, supra note 7, at 245-46.
77. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 1733 (2012).
78. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468-69.
79. The Court explicitly distinguished cases involving mandatory LWOP sentencing of juveniles
from those involving mandatory LWOP sentencing of adults and affirmed its own holding in Harmelin,
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 956 (1991), when the Court upheld a mandatory LWOP sentence for cocaine
possession. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469-70 (discussing why state arguments against "individualized
considerations" in juvenile sentencing to LWOP were not persuasive). See also Fan, supra note 24, at
604-09 (discussing the factors used by Justice Kennedy to distinguish mandatory LWOP sentencing of
adults from individualized juvenile LWOP sentencing).
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the vast majority of noncapital cases the presentation and consideration of
mitigation remains entirely elective.
The capital defense community has devoted so much attention to
capturing and documenting the professional services required to provide
clients with effective mitigation because mitigation contextualizes and
explains offenses that otherwise remain unfathomable and appear to be
attributable to an essential, unchangeable, and irredeemable evil rather than
to readily identifiable social forces.80 As described in the next section, the
same social influences that explain capital crimes in many cases explain
noncapital crimes.8' The work used to develop an understanding of people
who stand before juries and judges convicted of the most serious offenses
should certainly be applied to evoke merciful sentencing for people accused
or convicted of lesser violations of the law. 82 That work must begin with
defense lawyers applying mitigation to the representation of noncapital
clients. The next section describes how, while noncapital defense norms
provide broad outlines for competent sentencing advocacy, there is no
specific requirement for comprehensive mitigation investigation as there is
in capital cases.
IV. Professional Standards of Noncapital Mitigation
A. Supreme Court Dicta on Individualized Noncapital Sentencing
In Woodson, the Supreme Court noted that in noncapital cases "the
prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally
reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative."83
In capital cases, by comparison, "the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment" elevated what was only good policy in
noncapital sentencing to a constitutional requirement of "consideration of
the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense . . . ."84 The Court quoted Pennsylvania v. Ashe,ss a
noncapital case, in recognizing that "[fjor the determination of sentences,
justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by
which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account the
circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of
80. See Haney, Social Context, supra note 5, at 549 (noting that the criminal system and the
media cause American citizens "to view capital defendants as genetic misfits"). See also Stetler, supra
note 7, at 248-54 (explaining the importance of collaborative defense work in capital cases). See also
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[E]vidence about the
defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that
defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to
emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.").
81. See discussion infra Part IV.F.
82. See Cole, supra note 10, at 37-39, 40.
83. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
84. Id.
85. Comm. ofPa. ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937).
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the offender."8 6
In Lockett, the Court elaborated on the longstanding recognition
that "individualized sentencing in criminal cases generally, although not
constitutionally required, has long been accepted in this country."87 The
Court went on to explain that "sentencing judges traditionally have taken a
wide range of factors into account.. . . [a]nd where sentencing discretion is
granted, it generally has been agreed that the sentencing judge's possession
of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and
characteristics is highly relevant if not essential to the selection of an
appropriate sentence."88 The Court underscored that in noncapital cases
there was "wide acceptance" for the "the established practice" of
individualized sentences and that such practice, though not constitutionally
mandated as it was in capital cases, was "public policy enacted into
statutes."89
Capital sentencing continued to move toward individualization
while noncapital sentencing, particularly in federal cases but also in many
states,90 moved toward uniformity with the adoption of the mandatory
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 91 More recently, however, the Court has
reemphasized the importance of individualized noncapital sentencing. 92 In
Pepper v. United States, the Court reaffirmed that "possession of the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics"93
is "highly relevant-if not essential-to the selection of an appropriate
sentence." 9 4  The Court characterized as "uniform and constant"95 the
federal sentencing tradition to "consider every convicted person as an
individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that
sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to
ensue. . . . Underlying this tradition is the principle that the punishment
should fit the offender and not merely the crime." 96
Woodson and Lockett suggest that at one time there was a
"prevailing practice"97 of sentencers taking into account the facts of the
offense as well as the "fullest information possible" about the defendant's
86. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (quoting Ashe, 302 U.S. at 55) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added).
87. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
247-48 (1949)).
88. Lockett, 428 U.S. at 602-03 (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 247) (internal quotation marks
and punctuation omitted).
89. Lockett, 428 U.S. at 605.
90. See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 35.
91. See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240-41 (2011).
92. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 245 (2003); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490-92 (2000).
93. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
94. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
95. Id. at 1239 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
96. Id. at 1240 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
97. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
58 [Vol. 41:1
2013] Making Mitigation the Heart of Noncapital Sentencing
life circumstances and character and that such consideration was essential
to enlightened sentencing practice.98 The cases also reflect renewed interest
in individualized noncapital sentencing, at least among some members of
the Court. Yet, the professional norms governing criminal defense lawyers'
sentencing practice have not kept pace with such statements concerning the
importance of individualized noncapital sentencing.99 One possible reason
is that historically, all parties have relied on court-based probation and
parole departments to provide an "independent" sentencing report for the
court to reference in meting punishment.100 Another possibility is that
because Supreme Court dicta recognized that there was no constitutional
imperative for individualized noncapital sentencing,'0' defense lawyers and
courts treated mitigation investigation and presentation as elective, and
therefore it never took widespread hold as a core defense duty. In addition,
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines prohibited consideration of certain life
circumstances, such as poverty or disadvantaged upbringing, in favor of a
focus on "real conduct." 02 This prohibition trained most federal criminal
defense practice on Guidelines calculation rather than on investigation of
sentencing factors that courts were instructed to disregard. This led to an
atrophying of noncapital mitigation practice among federal defense
lawyers.103  However, as Pepper has recognized, the post-mandatory
Guidelines era has reopened the opportunity for life history mitigation
presentations in federal noncapital sentencing.104
While the current guidelines for noncapital defense sentencing
advocacy are broad enough to warrant some degree of independent
sentencing investigation beyond the data provided by probation
departments or prosecutors, they remain a far cry from the capital
guidelines' specific prescriptions for comprehensive social history
investigation. 05 There is also a significant gulf between the noncapital
guidelines' recommendations for essential sentencing advocacy and
prevailing defense practice in many jurisdictions, especially those strapped
for resources.
The standards reviewed here are those of the major national
professional organizations setting forth practice norms for criminal defense
lawyers: the ABA, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
98. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978).
99. See generally, Hessick, supra note 26, at 1109-10 (noting that professional standards and
substantive law regarding advocacy for noncapital defendants are underdeveloped and "lopsided").
100. Of course this raises the question what, if any, information the defense has been expected to
provide to those agencies.
101. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1239-40.
102. Id. at 1240-41.
103. See Adriaan Lanni, Jury Sentencing In Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come
(Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1783 (1999) (discussing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines'
consideration of various life circumstances as "not ordinarily relevant" to federal sentencing).
104. See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1241.
105. See Hessick, supra note 26, at 1070, 1110 (calling the standards for what constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel in noncapital sentencing proceedings "underdeveloped").
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(NLADA), and the American College of Trial Lawyers.
B. ABA Criminal Justice Standards
The noncapital ABA sentencing guidelines include the following
principles: independent defense investigation of sentencing factors;
individualized consideration of sentences; presentation of mitigating
factors; and consideration of those factors by the evaluating court. The
court should evaluate both the severity of the offense and the culpability of
the particular offender. The principal ABA guidelines for noncapital cases
are the ABA Criminal Justice Standards, which have existed in various
forms for over forty years.106 Two subsets of those standards speak most
directly to the role of mitigation in noncapital cases: the Defense Function
standards, which pertain to defense counsel's professional obligations at
sentencing, and the Sentencing standards, which govern the role of
legislatures, probation and parole agencies, and courts.
The Defense Function standards describe the basic duties of
defense lawyers to investigate and to provide sentencing advocacy, but
nowhere do they explicitly describe a duty to investigate mitigation.
According to the Defense Function standards, a defense lawyer should
conduct a "prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to . . . penalty . .. "to0 Defense
counsel should become familiar with all resources and sentencing
alternatives available to the court that may meet the defendant's needs. 0
Defense counsel should also be familiar with the court's sentencing habits
and any applicable guidelines.109 Counsel is obligated to explain to the
client the consequences of the various available dispositions.110 In addition,
"[d]efense counsel should present to the court any ground which will assist
in reaching a proper disposition favorable to the accused," including
recommending rehabilitative programs, "I and must verify, supplement, or
challenge information in any presentence report made available to the
defense."i 2
The second relevant subset of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards,
the Sentencing standards, makes recommendations for legislatures, relevant
agencies, and sentencing courts." These standards, unlike the Defense
106. About Criminal Justice Standards, AM. BAR ASS'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminaljustice/standards.html (last updated 2014).
107. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.1(a)
(1993) [hereinafter DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS].
108. Id. at § 4-8.1(a).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at § 4-8.1(b).
112. Id.
113. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING (1994) [hereinafter SENTENCING
STANDARDS].
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Function standards, at times explicitly provide for the development,
presentation, and consideration of mitigation, but by the "intermediate
agencies" and courts, rather than by defense counsel. For example, one
Sentencing standard recommends individualization of sentences,114 which is
consistent with Lockett's recognition that, at least as far back as
Pennsylvania v. Ashe and Williams v. New York, sentencing courts have
accounted for a wide range of factors that shed light on the "character and
propensities" of the offender, not just the offense."l5 The Sentencing
standards urge legislatures to authorize sentencing courts to exercise
discretion, taking into account the circumstances of the offense and the
characteristics of the offender." 6
The ABA's Sentencing standards also devote a specific section to
"Mitigating Factors" aimed at legislatures and agencies performing the
"intermediate function" of identifying relevant sentencing characteristics
before sentencing (a function usually performed by probation or parole
departments)." 7 The ABA recommends that once mitigating factors have
been identified, intermediate agencies ought to guide courts to use their
discretion to adjust the sentence accordingly." 8  Implicit in this
recommendation is the recognition that mitigation may impact the
sentencer's consideration of the defendant's blameworthiness. Mitigation
may contextualize the defendant's actions through applicable mitigating
factors, or change the sentencer's view of the offender by providing
information about circumstances that set the defendant apart from "the
ordinary offender," particularly if those characteristics are ones of
hardship.119
This principle is longstanding and crucial in capital sentencing, and
the ABA guidelines for courts and agencies preparing sentencing profiles
affirm that the principle is fundamental to proportional noncapital
punishment as well.
Read together, the noncapital ABA standards offer defense counsel
and sentencing courts wide latitude to present and consider a range of
mitigation, not necessarily directly related to the defendant's criminal
culpability, and to use that mitigation to advocate for or impose an
alternative or ameliorated sentence. They also establish that the agencies
114. Id. at § 18-2.6(a).
115. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
116. SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 113, at § 18-2.6(a)(i)-(ii).
117. Id. at § 18-3.2. For a fuller description of the role of probation departments in preparing
presentence investigation reports, see ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE
OF CRIMINAL CASES 285-86 (Vol. 11988).
118. SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 113, at § 18-2.6(a)-(b). Moreover, in regimes with
presumptive sentences, the guidelines recommend that courts consider mitigating factors in selecting
lesser sentences within a presumptive range, or depart downward from the range. Id. at § 18-3.2(d).
119. Id. at § 18-3.2(b); see also id. at § 18-3.4(c). The standard also requires that all information
in presentence reports is accurate, verifiable, and accessible. If it is challenged by either the prosecution
or the defense, the preparer of the report must help determine whether the information can be
substantiated. Id. at § 18-5.3.
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tasked with preparing presentence reports have a duty to include mitigation,
and courts have a duty to consider mitigation when imposing a punishment.
C. NLADA Guidelines
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA), an
organization representing both civil and criminal defense legal aid
attorneys, 12 0 likewise has guidelines for defense sentencing representation.
The NLADA Guidelines are more specific than their ABA counterparts in
describing defense lawyers' duties before and during noncapital sentencing
and explicitly require counsel to "ensure all reasonably available mitigating
and favorable information, which is likely to benefit the client, is presented
to the court[.]"l21 The NLADA also recommends the use of "sentencing
specialists" in appropriate cases. 12 2 Like the ABA standards, the NLADA
Guidelines require defense lawyers to be familiar with any sentencing
report and to correct misstatements or omissions of helpful sentencing
information as well as to be familiar with the relevant law and practice. 123
The NLADA Guidelines also require defense counsel to develop a plan for
achieving the least restrictive sentencing outcome based on the particular
client's circumstances1 24 and social history.125  The NLADA Guidelines
require that counsel, where necessary, specifically request the opportunity
to present evidence at the sentencing hearing.12 6  Finally, the NLADA
Guidelines provide for a defense sentencing memorandum, which presents
another opportunity to challenge inaccurate or incomplete information in
the official presentence report, to include information favorable to the
defendant, and to make a defense sentencing recommendation.127 In short,
the NLADA's compendium of defense lawyers' duties at noncapital
sentencing is comparatively more robust and more specific than the
120. The NLADA describes itself as "America's oldest and largest nonprofit association devoted
to excellence in the delivery of legal services to those who cannot afford counsel" and it "serves as the
collective voice for our country's civil legal aid and public defender services." NAT'L LEGAL AID &
DEFENDER ASS'N, http://www.nlada.org/About/About Home (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). This is in
contrast to the ABA which is a professional organization representing all attorneys of any specialty,
making possible that attorneys other than those practicing criminal defense, and in fact some
prosecutors, might have a role in promulgating defense function guidelines. Certainly the adoption of
the guidelines by the entire ABA must require the buy-in of current and former prosecutors and judges.
121. PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION § 8.1(a)(3) (Nat'l
Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n 1995) [hereinafter NLADA Guidelines].
122. Id at § 8.1(a)(6).
123. See id. at §§ 8.1(a)(2), 8.1(a)(5), and 8.2; see also id. at § 8.4 (requiring counsel to provide
the person preparing the report information favorable to the client and to be familiar with and prepared
to challenge any inaccuracies in the official presentence report).
124. Id at § 8.1(a)(4).
125. See id at § 8.3(a)(3).
126. Id. at § 8.3(a)(9); see also id. at § 8.7 (recommending that counsel be prepared to request
and present evidence at an evidentiary hearing during sentencing).
127. NLADA Guidelines, supra note 121, at § 8.6(a)(4) and (a)(7). The NLADA Guidelines also
require counsel to advise the client about avenues for petitioning the court for a sentencing reduction and
any time limitations on doing so. See id. at § 9.5.
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analogous ABA Guidelines.
D. Amsterdam Trial Manual
Another source of professional standards for defense lawyers in
noncapital cases is the trial manual "For the Defense of Criminal Cases,"
published by the American College of Trial Lawyers, the NLADA, and the
American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on
Continuing Professional Education.'28 The author of the fifth edition of the
manual, Professor Anthony Amsterdam, is a foremost expert in capital and
noncapital criminal defense and successfully litigated Furman v.
Georgia.12 9 The chapters relevant to investigation and sentencing, dating
back at least to the 1980s, provide a prescription for competent noncapital
sentencing representation and reinforce the conclusion that the investigation
and presentation of facts favorable to the defendant, including relevant
psychological or psychiatric issues, have long been considered critical to
meaningful sentencing representation.13 0
Like the ABA and NLADA guidelines, the trial manual emphasizes
the importance of defense sentencing investigation, including interviewing
life history witnesses and collecting relevant records.13' The manual adds
mental health investigation, which the other guidelines do not explicitly
include, and it advises defense counsel to consider having the client
psychiatrically evaluated-the results of which might support medical
rather than punitive treatment and which might prove useful in
mitigation.13 2  A comprehensive social history along with corroborating
documents undergird any effective mental health evaluation, and that
investigation is an indispensable part of developing an accurate and
convincing set of conclusions and recommendations concerning a criminal
client's mental health history and route to rehabilitation. 33  The manual
suggests that trial counsel take the following actions: provide information to
the probation officer preparing the sentencing report and recommendation;
and work with the client's employer and family to stabilize the client's life
and to make a sentencing plan that maximizes the chances of an outcome
128. AMSTERDAM, supra note 117.
129. See Jeffrey Toobin, Comeback, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 26, 2007),
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/2007/03/26/070326ta-talk-toobin.
130. For a history of the Trial Manual's development and editions, see AMSTERDAM, supra note
117, at vii-ix.
131. AMSTERDAM,supra note 117, at 181-84, 186-90.
132. Id. at 196. This is particularly salient given that the Bureau of Justice Statistics has
concluded that approximately 60% of prisoners in state prisons and 40% of prisoners in local jails suffer
from mental illness. See Doris J. James & James E. Glaze, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail
Inmates (2005), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
133. Richard G. Dudley, Jr. & Pamela Blume Leonard, Getting It Right: Life History
Investigation as the Foundation for a Reliable Mental Health Assessment, 36 HOFsTRA L. REV. 964,
974-75 (2008) ("As a general rule, it is never appropriate to expect a mental health expert to deliver a
comprehensive mental health assessment of the client until the life history investigation is complete.").
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short of incarceration' 34-including recommendations for community
resources that can help "lend specialized assistance to a probationary
regimen.""'5 The manual recommends that counsel litigate for disclosure of
the presentence investigation report in jurisdictions where it is not disclosed
to the defense.13 6 Furthermore, the manual provides more detail than the
ABA or NLADA Guidelines about counsel's duty to ensure the accuracy of
the client's prior criminal history, requiring, for example, that counsel let
the record reflect favorable dispositions of arrests and commitments listed
in law enforcement "rap sheets." 37 At the sentencing hearing, the defense
should present evidence including witness testimony, affidavits, or
letters.138 Finally, defense counsel should make an argument on sentencing,
the focus of which is individualized sentencing with an emphasis on
rehabilitation over retribution.'39
E. Implications of Noncapital Sentencing Professional Practice Guidelines
The ABA, NLADA, and Amsterdam standards together establish
that effective noncapital sentencing advocacy requires, at a minimum,
independent investigation of a client's background, mental health,
conditions that might benefit from treatment or social service intervention,
and potential for rehabilitation. They require defense lawyers to provide
helpful information to the agency preparing the presentence investigation
(PSI) report, substantiate its contents, challenge any inaccuracies, and know
the relevant sentencing law and procedure. Finally, defense lawyers must
be prepared to present and argue in support of any information that may
ameliorate the client's sentence.
Notwithstanding these professional standards, mitigation in capital
134. AMSTERDAM,supra note 117, at 286-87.
135. Id. at 291.
136. Id at 288-89. Here, the manual expressly employs the reasoning from the capital case
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977)-wherein the Supreme Court struck down a death sentence as
unconstitutional because it was issued based on materials provided to the sentencing judge but not to the
defense-to argue for disclosure of PSI reports in noncapital sentencing proceedings. See AMSTERDAM,
supra note 117, at 289 ( "[A]lthough ... Gardner is, by its terms, applicable only to death cases, much
of the reasoning .. .would support a Due Process requirement of PSI reports to the defense in noncapital
cases as well.").
137. See AMSTERDAM, supra note 117, at 297-99; id. at 298 (noting that clarification is
important because "[o]ccasionally a half dozen entries that make the defendant look like Jack the Ripper
may be only several stages in the processing of a single criminal charge"); cf NLADA Guidelines,
supra note 121, at § 8.6(a)(4) (using general terms to refer to defense counsel's duty to provide
"information favorable to the defendant concerning ... the offense, mitigating factors and relative
culpability, prior offenses").
138. AMsTERDAM,supra note 117, at 301-02.
139. Id. at 302 (noting that the focus "must be on the defendant as a person: his or her good
record, lack of violence, and the other factors that make the defendant nondangerous if released; the
pressures of the moment that led the defendant to commit this crime and will not recur, the needs for the
defendant in the community (to support his or her family, to earn money to make restitution to the
complainant); and the greater rehabilitative potential of the favorable disposition counsel urges than of
any harsher one").
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cases is still generally far more developed and robust than it is in noncapital
cases. The noncapital guidelines and practice norms certainly provide wide
latitude and broad prescriptions for the development, presentation, and
consideration of a variety of factors in support of merciful individualized
sentencing. However, everyday noncapital defense sentencing practice
does not yet reflect the lesson of capital sentencing that presentation of
circumstances that have affected the client's understanding and behavior is
crucial to a fair assessment of his blameworthiness and to the imposition of
a proportional and just sentence.
F. The Relevance of Mitigating Factors To Noncapital Sentencing
Although the very same circumstances that impact consideration of
a capital offender's moral culpability are prevalent among defendants and
prisoners implicated in less serious crimes, as discussed infra the Eighth
Amendment "death is different" doctrine has definitively distinguished
capital from noncapital sentencing.14 0 That distinction has obscured the
impact of circumstances such as poverty, trauma, mental illness, intellectual
disability, and other unquantifiable and idiosyncratic vulnerabilities in
routine criminal cases. Decades of determinate and Guidelines-based
sentencing have also discouraged presentation of social history factors
deemed irrelevant to the sentencing grids. As described in the next section,
institutional and legal hurdles to investigation and consideration of
mitigation in noncapital cases certainly remain, but sentencers will continue
to lack a meaningful opportunity to consider the relevance of mitigating
factors unless noncapital defense lawyers uncover them, corroborate them,
and explain their impact on clients' lives. Only after defense lawyers insist
on mitigation's consideration will courts routinely begin to accept its
salience to any just sentencing.
Comprehensive noncapital mitigation presentations will benefit
individual defendants by providing a basis both for a fair sentence and for a
meaningful road to rehabilitation and redemption. As in capital cases,
development of more probing noncapital mitigation, primarily social
histories, will present a more systemic opportunity to "provide a framework
for comprehending a single, violent social history, and serve as the basis for
the development of a responsible social policy of violence prevention in
lieu [of] . . . mindless punitiveness . . . ."I" Because capital cases
necessarily begin with homicides, much capital mitigation helps to explain
the genesis of the violence. It follows, however, that some of the same
psychological and public health 42 factors that correlate with violence lead
140. See discussion infra Part V.C.
141. Haney, Social Context, supra note 5, at 562. Professor Haney also describes the
destabilizing consequences of poverty, including the chaos occasioned by frequent moves and new
schools. Id. at 567.
142. For example, lead exposure has been linked to a myriad of health problems and rising crime
rates. Kevin Drum, America's Real Criminal Element: Lead, MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2013, available
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others to numb themselves through drug use.'4 3  It also follows that
poverty'" correlates with violent crime and some theft (other than most
white collar embezzlement).145
1. Poverty and Trauma
Two of the most prominent features of capital mitigation are
poverty and trauma, including parental abuse and neglect.146 Poverty's
impact is unmistakably widespread and, though it defies generalization, its
psychological and behavioral consequences among some capital defendants
include: endemic despair, frustration, undersocialization of children,
interference with nurturant parenting, and, in some instances, aggression
leading to violence.14 7 There is every reason to expect that poverty has the
same psychological effects on people who happen to commit less serious
offenses. Yet, unlike in capital cases, in noncapital cases there is no
imperative for a sentencer to consider the consequences of poverty on the
defendant's moral culpability or for a defense lawyer to present it in
mitigation.
The same can be said of trauma, including childhood abuse and
neglectl 4 8-factors nearly ubiquitous in capital cases.149 The psychological
and behavioral results of trauma are, like poverty, complex and varied but
include: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety,
at http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2013/01/lead-crime-link-gasoline.
143. Haney, Social Context, supra note 5, at 585; Wayland, supra note 22, at 942. See also S.
Fazel et al., Journal of the AMA (May 20, 2009) (schizophrenia study); S. Fazel et al., Archives of Gen.
Psychiatry (Sept. 2010) (bipolar study documenting markedly higher rates of crime among people with
bipolar disorder or schizophrenia when combined with substance abuse).
144. See Jeremy Kaplan-Lyman, A Punitive Bind: Policing, Poverty, and Neoliberalism in New
York City, 15 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 177, 185 (2012) (noting the positive correlation between
poverty and violent crime); Candace McCoy, From Sociological Trends of 1992 to the Criminal Courts
of 2020, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1967, 1980 (1993) (suggesting poverty's association with other
circumstances, such as unemployment, may "dispose a person to commit crimes").
145. For an exploration of the application of mitigation to noncapital white collar criminal
proceedings, see Todd Haugh, Can the CEO Learn from the Condemned? The Application of Capital
Mitigation Strategies to White Collar Cases, 62 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (2012). For a more general
description of white collar sentencing trends, see, for example, Daniel Richman, Federal White Collar
Sentencing in The United States: A Work In Progress, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 53 (2013).
146. See Haney, Social Context, supra note 5, at 561-63 (discussing a social history analysis of
capital defendants and the common themes of trauma and poverty).
147. Id. at 565.
148. Id. at 574-75.
149. See generally Wayland, supra note 22, at 930-31 (noting that "[t]he most common
traumatic events experienced by many [capitally charged] clients" include "childhood victimization,
physical and sexual assault, [and] severe neglect" which are "rarely isolated occurrences"); Haney,
Social Context, supra note 5, at 573 ("[W]hen many of us began doing this work ... looking carefully at
the social histories of capital defendants, we were struck, all of us, by the frequency with which our
clients were brutalized as children. The patterns were striking, but it took years to carefully document
them. Now, there is little question about the causal connections. Study after study has confirmed the
cycle of violence . . . .").
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psychosis, dissociation, significant impairment, and substance abuse,s 0
which is at the heart of several and various types of criminal cases."'
Moreover, the effects of childhood maltreatment "reverberate throughout
the life course." 5 2 This fact is well established and is gaining traction in
the popular press, with one conservative commentator writing that schools
and health care providers are beginning to look more closely at trauma and
poverty as "producing enormous amounts of stress and unregulated
behavior, which dulls motivation, undermines self-control and distorts
lives."' 53
The criminal justice system, along with the health care system, is
the institution most likely to document the psychological and behavioral
effects of poverty and trauma on adults-yet it requires no accounting of
these factors in noncapital cases. When adults who have survived brutal
abuse and neglect in childhood or trauma inflicted in adulthood, including
in custodial settings, commit noncapital crimes, there is no requirement that
sentencers account for the trauma or its psychological or behavioral effects
before they fix punishment. Notwithstanding the professional guidelines,
there is also no legal requirement that defense lawyers present such
evidence of their clients' traumatic histories.
2. Racial Discrimination
The effects of racial discrimination constitute another pervasive
trauma that is common among those charged with and convicted of crimes.
As Professor Haney has eloquently put it: "You must confront the fact that
racism, institutional racism, exposes persons of Color to experiences that no
one else has in this society, experiences that leave an indelible mark." 54
The convergence of racism with other types of maltreatment and poverty is
uniquely debilitating."' Racism is also a major contributor to arrests or
convictions of "street crimes," which are often the basis of defendants' prior
records and increase their punishment liability.'56 In fact, at least one court
150. Wayland, supra note 22, at 943.
15 1. Haney, Social Context, supra note 5, at 584; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
DRUGS AND CRIME FACTS, available at, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dcf/duc.cfm#drug-related.
152. Debra Umberson et al., Social Relationships and Health Behavior Across Life Course, 36
ANNU. REv. SOCIOL. 139, 139 (2010). The Supreme Court has continued to affirm the principle that
youth is particularly mitigating. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Jackson v. Hobbs, 132
S. Ct. 1733 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Yet, the impact of youthful trauma is not neatly quarantined to the period before a person turns eighteen,
particularly because juvenile status is the paradigmatic "bright line" condition. It is absurd to think that
someone who may be eighteen and a half, nineteen, or even in his early twenties is somehow so far
removed from events marring his formative development that his background is not relevant to an
assessment of his moral culpability.
153. David Brooks, The Psych Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, at A35, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/opinion/brooks-the-psych-approach.html?_r-0.
154. Haney, Social Context, supra note 5, at 582 (emphasis in original).
155. Id. at 580.
156. Lanni, supra note 103, at 1786.
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has issued a downward sentencing departure based on criminal history in
recognition of the disproportionate arrests of black men for minor traffic
violations, which in that case comprised most of the defendant's prior
convictions.' 57 Another federal sentencing court considered in remarkable
detail the defendants' social histories and the role of racism in trapping
some of those defendants in a practically inescapable matrix of
deprivation.'5 8  These decisions suggest that some courts are open to
consideration of racial discrimination as a mitigating factor. Despite the
fact that racism is a trauma that diminishes opportunity and increases
exposure to punishment, the impact of racism, much less the cumulative
effect of racism compounded by multiple trauma and poverty, rarely if ever
makes it into a presentence presentation of any kind in a noncapital case. 159
3. Intellectual Disability
Intellectual disability, formerly known as mental retardation, is so
central to the evaluation of a capitally charged person's moral culpability
that it precludes imposition of the death penalty.160 Among the reasons
people with intellectual disability should not be sentenced to death are their
"diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reactions of others."16 ' The intellectually disabled are also more likely to be
followers rather than leaders and to act on impulse rather than as the result
of premeditation.162  Intellectual disability may also interfere with a
person's capacity to assist with his defense or to appear remorseful for his
crimes.'63  Each of these characteristics applies with equal force to
intellectually disabled people charged with noncapital crimes.'6 Yet, the
Supreme Court has never held that intellectual disability is a relevant
noncapital sentencing consideration, leaving it up to individual jurisdictions
how they account for intellectual disability at punishment-even when the
defendant is facing a sentence as harsh as life without the possibility of
parole.165
157. United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33-34 (1998).
158. United States v. Bannister, 786 F. Supp. 2d 617, 631-33 (2011) (dedicating a portion of the
opinion to the "Roots of African American Segregation and Poverty").
159. As with a number of the mitigating circumstances described herein that capital defense
lawyers have presented in their cases but noncapital defense lawyers generally have not, evidence of
systemic racism has long been used in capital litigation. See Buck v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 32 (2011);
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
160. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306-07, 321 (2002).
161. Id. at 318.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 320-21.
164. See Barkow, supra note 19, at 1161.
165. See id.
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The upshot is that though the very same adverse social forces that
characterize the lives of capital defendants riddle the backgrounds of
noncapital defendants, aside from recommendations in the professional
standards for criminal defense lawyers, there is no doctrinal requirement
that defense attorneys present these factors, or that noncapital sentencers be
made aware of or take these factors into account before imposing
punishment. To be sure, the convergence of factors in any person's life is
going to impact her uniquely.' 66 But the hard work of describing the
particular mitigating effect of a terrible life history on the person standing
accused of an aggravated crime is at the heart of effective capital
representation, and it should be at the core of noncapital representation as
well. Otherwise, individualized justice will continue to elude most criminal
proceedings, and the view that unfettered choice, endemic personal evil,
and unmoored "free will" are the reasons people violate the law will
continue to unduly influence noncapital sentencing.167  Meaningful
noncapital mitigation presentations also present affirmative opportunities to
treat sentencing hearings as fact-finding tribunals that produce a cumulative
record of social histories that can discern patterns to help experts, social
service providers, policymakers, and actors in the justice system develop
effective treatments for the recurring ills strongly associated with crime.168
4. Positive Sentencing Factors
One final point on the development of mitigation in noncapital
cases: as the professional guidelines and Professor Amsterdam's trial
manual reflect, in noncapital sentencing there must be more emphasis on
positive factors in the defendant's life, such as educational and employment
opportunities, family support, and access to and amenability to
rehabilitative services. 16 9 This is how it should be if alternatives to long-
term incarceration and rehabilitation are primary goals of the justice and
penal systems. In order for noncapital defense lawyers to advocate
successfully for less punitive sentences and alternatives to lengthy prison
terms, they will need to account for both the adverse life circumstances that
explain a client's participation in a criminal offense as well as the positive
and protective factors in the client's life that will make him a candidate
166. Haney, Social Context, supra note 5, at 602 ("[V]irtually no psychological cause or social
influence produces the same effect in everyone.").
167. See id at 603.
168. See id. at 606-08. This argument does not account for the fact that plenty of wealthy
people break the law privately all the time (e.g., abusing drugs) and are never caught, arrested, or
charged, so any conclusions about the roots of criminal behavior will be skewed by arrest and charging
patterns. Relatively wealthy law breakers' behavior may not be attributable to poverty, or, if they are
white, to racism, but it may be influenced by trauma or other mental illness.
169. See AMSTERDAM, supra note 117, at 196; NLADA Guidelines, supra note 121, at § 8.2; cf
Barkow, supra note 19, at 1201 (suggesting courts use a more restrictive approach, requiring "only
mitigating evidence that relates to a defendant's reduced culpability" and not requiring "evidence about
a defendant's good moral character or prospects for rehabilitation").
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worthy of rehabilitation and, even if he is sent to prison, eventual
reintegration into the free world. In a noncapital case, it will not be enough,
as it might be in some capital cases, to explain the roots of someone's law-
breaking behavior. A good sentencing advocate must also describe how a
person will live, and what resources the client needs and will have available
if he is given a chance outside prison. This is particularly true because
circumstances such as mental illness and addiction may inspire fear in the
sentencer that if the defendant is not incarcerated he will be a danger to
others or to himself.170 In capital cases, by contrast, there is usually no
possibility that the convicted person will be released, so the consideration is
only whether he will be a danger in prison. Thus, in noncapital cases the
careful presentation of protective factors that will buffer the adverse
consequences of the defendant's troubled life history is crucial to guarding
against the conclusion that mitigation is double edged.
Notwithstanding the reasons outlined here-those grounded in
professional duty, those supporting individualized sentencing, and those
urging an opportunity to learn more about the true causes and possible
means of reducing crime-powerful institutional hurdles present challenges
to widespread adoption of the worthy practice of investigating, presenting,
and considering social history mitigation in noncapital sentencing. The
next section explores some of those challenges.
V. Institutional Hurdles to More Robust Noncapital Mitigation
Several institutional and legal hurdles hinder more robust
noncapital mitigation. The sheer variety and volume of possible cases and
lack of indigent defense resources (both time and money), and the fact that
most noncapital cases are resolved by pleas preclude mitigation efforts.
Further, there are challenges in applying the "death is different" paradigm
that has been the basis of the Eighth Amendment requirement of
individualized capital sentencing and related challenges in applying it to
noncapital sentences, particularly in jurisdictions with mandatory
sentencing and where judges, not juries, impose punishment.
A. Variety and Volume of Noncapital Cases
Noncapital criminal cases run the gamut from petty theft to
noncapital murder, unlike in capital cases where a homicide with some
aggravating feature forms the basis of the capital charge. It is therefore
almost impossible to enforce a uniform set of actions that defense lawyers
170. For example, evidence of brain damage might be double-edged in a noncapital case. When
presented effectively in a capital case, brain damage can be quite powerful mitigation. See Porter v.
McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 42 (2009). In a noncapital case, however, where the sentencer will be
concerned about the permanence or intractability of a defendant's proclivity for instability,
unpredictable behavior, or violence, emphasis on brain damage may not be ideal mitigation if the
defense's goal is reduced incarceration time.
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must take in every criminal case in order to ensure effective sentencing
advocacy.
As the noncapital guidelines establish, the following are basic tools
that should apply in every case, and this list is by no means exhaustive:
independent defense investigation of the circumstances of the offense;
defense verification or challenge of items in any agency-prepared
presentence report; defense investigation of a client's prior record,
including mitigating factors relevant to prior offenses and clarification if
certain charges never resulted in convictions; defense investigation of the
client's social history-including poverty, living conditions, dependent
relatives, employment history and opportunity, history of mental illness or
substance addiction, cognitive ability or intellectual deficit, trauma history;
investigation of community resources that are viable alternatives to
incarceration or a means of improving prospects of rehabilitation even if
prison is unavoidable; and preparation of a defense sentencing plan and
argument to be presented orally or in writing, with supporting evidence, to
the probation agency, if appropriate, and the sentencing judge.171
Each case will warrant its own approach, tailored to the individual
client and the seriousness of the charged offense. The more serious
offenses may necessitate hiring a defense sentencing specialist akin to a
mitigation specialist in capital cases.172  Minor offenses may call for a
simple explanation of the circumstances leading to the client's criminal
involvement and a proposal for social work or mental health intervention,
along with some form of appropriate restitution instead of a lengthy
incarceration. The range of possibilities for sound sentencing advocacy will
vary along a continuum according to the seriousness of the offense. This is
not to suggest, however, that consideration of a client's background should
be taken less seriously in cases involving minor offenses. To the contrary,
if a defense team identifies a client's vulnerabilities and areas that would
benefit from available support and can advocate successfully for programs
that will divert him from more serious criminal involvement, then defense
counsel will have succeeded in using mitigation exactly as it is intended to
work. 173
The caseloads facing most defense lawyers, especially public
171. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 277, 317 (2011) (discussing defense counsel's "duty to
investigate evidence relevant to mitigation of the sentence"). See also State v. Fuerst, 512 N.W.2d 243,
246 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that a defendant's "personal and social history is important to"
sentencing consideration); Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at
Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 52 (2011) (stating that sentences can vary "based on the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding the crime, such as harm to the victim or the defendant's motive").
172. The sentencing specialist would assist in interviewing witnesses and gathering documents
to build the social history, facilitate work with any experts who can help explain the impact of the
client's background on his behavior, particularly leading up to the offense, and assist in drafting the
defense presentence report and proposed plan for treatment and rehabilitation or for appropriate
therapeutic support while the client is in custody.
173. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 171, at 317.
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defenders, present a more difficult institutional obstacle to routine
comprehensive defense sentencing investigation. In many jurisdictions,
public defender offices bear dockets of 100 or more cases per attorney,
preventing these attorneys from performing basic tasks required by the
Sixth Amendment, such as staying in touch with their clients or filing
motions in their cases.174 In addition, since most noncapital prosecutions
proceed much more quickly than capital prosecutions, the difficulties of
building trust and rapport with witnesses and gathering records in enough
time to meaningfully investigate mitigation are exacerbated in the
noncapital context. Money is also an issue, especially for court-appointed
lawyers who work in private practice rather than in institutional defender
organizations with staff investigators, social workers, and budgets for
mitigation specialists and other experts.175  It is therefore difficult to
imagine overburdened public defenders having the time or resources to
provide comprehensive mitigation investigation in each of their cases on a
regular basis.176
Plenty has been written proposing strategies to reduce public
defender caseloads and allow for more effective indigent criminal
representation, and those recommendations need not be repeated here. 77
The proposal here, instead, is that public defender offices and other
attorneys with available resources take the lead in devoting time and
funding to meaningful investigation into mitigating circumstances relevant
to their client's blameworthiness and capacity for rehabilitation. Some
dedicated defenders and innovative offices already do so.178 Those who do
174. See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC
DEFENSE 12-13 (Joel Schumm ed. 2011); see also Hessick, supra note 26, at 1113 (citing the
"overwhelmingly large number of noncapital convictions and sentencings" that occur annually).
175. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, Measuring the Effect of Defense Counsel on
Homicide Case Outcomes, NAT'L INST. OF JUST. Dec. 2012, at 3, 36-37, available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ny/grants/241158.pdf (reporting that in Philadelphia homicide cases,
defendants with lawyers from the public defender's office, as opposed to appointed private counsel, had
more favorable case outcomes, including reduction of life sentencing by 64% and reduction of overall
expected prison time by 24%, and citing the public defender office's ability to hire experts as one reason
for the disparity).
176. Resources are a very difficult implication in capital cases as well, and many capital
defendants face trial and habeas proceedings with fewer resources than necessary for a meaningful
defense. Even in Rompilla-one of the Supreme Court's bedrock capital ineffective assistance cases-
the dissent pointed to the difficulty of implementing the majority's holding given the scarcity of
resources for capital defenders. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 403 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(noting that the public defender's office that represented Rompilla at trial had two investigators for
2,000 cases).
177. See, e.g., LEFSTEIN, supra note 174; THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED:
AMERICA'S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7-9 (2009),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdfl139.pdf (noting the impediments to effective defense systems
and reforms in the system); NAT'L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, MINOR CRIME, MASSIVE
WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009),
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/misdemeanor_20090401 .pdf (explaining
factors rendering attorneys incapable of providing adequate legal representation to minors and
recommendations to improve such legal representation).
178. The Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem and the Bronx Defenders in New York City
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are advancing a necessary movement toward more meaningful
individualized sentencing, a reduction in overly harsh punishment, and a
look into the root causes of various crimes that may provide an opportunity
for development of more effective crime policies. Neighborhood-based
public defender agencies are especially well-situated to provide
comprehensive mitigation more efficiently than other indigent defense
providers because their locus in a particular community and an intimate
knowledge of a concentrated client population lowers the cost of
aggregating information about mitigating circumstances-such as arrest
patterns in over-policed areas, knowledge of particularly violence-plagued
housing complexes, shortages of mental health care resources, and so on.'79
These neighborhood defenders might therefore be best positioned to
provide wholesale mitigation data to courts at the lowest cost, after
developing the data in individual clients' cases.
Law school clinics are another resource. 80  Clinics may partner
with institutional defenders to expand defender offices' capacity to
investigate and present mitigation in sentencing hearings. Clinics may also
represent clients on their own and develop improved sentencing practices
that they might share through the development of practice manuals and
trainings made available to attorneys and investigators in their
communities. Partnerships with law schools, social work schools, and
schools of public health, for example, could augment defenders' resources
and utilize research and scholarship to develop data that might help explain
whether and why certain life circumstances are correlated with particular
types of criminal involvement.
Foundations and public funding sources dedicated to improving
justice systems should make resources available that will foster such
partnerships and allow public defender agencies to reduce their caseloads,
provide attorney and investigator training, and hire mitigation specialists
that will enhance their capacity for comprehensive sentencing advocacy.
None of these are perfect solutions, but they are steps toward
normalizing and making more widespread the expectation that mitigation is
a central, rather than marginal, part of competent noncapital defense
sentencing advocacy.
are good examples of offices that integrate social workers into their criminal defense teams to work
toward the best possible sentencing dispositions for clients. NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDER SERVICE OF
HARLEM, http://www.ndsny.org/programs/criminal-defense.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); BRONX
DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders.org/our-work/social-work (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
179. The Four Pillars of Holistic Defense, THE BRONX DEFENDERS (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://www.bronxdefenders.org/the-four-pillars-of-holistic-defense/.
180. Stanford Law School's Three Strikes Clinic has provided effective mitigation
representation in the cases of clients who have been life-sentenced based on sometimes low-level
offenses that counted as their "third strikes." Brent Staples, California Horror Stories and the 3-Strikes




AM. J. CRIM. L.
B. Prevalence of Plea Bargaining
The vast majority of noncapital criminal cases are resolved by
pleas.'8 ' In the 2012 term, the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Frye 82 and
Lafler v. Cooper83 delineated the considerations for determining when a
lawyer's performance is constitutionally ineffective when a client is
convicted at trial and the resulting sentence is substantially longer than the
sentence that would have resulted had the client been properly advised of an
available plea. 8 4  In doing so, the Supreme Court recognized, as lower
courts have for some time,'18 that the prevalence of agreed dispositions in
criminal cases necessitates a standard for the effective assistance of defense
lawyers not just at trial but also during plea bargaining, which has become
"central to the administration of the criminal justice system." 86 In fact, one
federal appellate judge has observed that "virtually all defendants plead
guilty, usually in return for some sentencing concession as compared with
the 'going rate' after trial."' 87 That "going rate" is inflated by design in
order to incentivize more defendants to choose pleas,' 8 and a defendant's
principal incentive to plead guilty is to leverage the best possible sentence,
which is usually better than the sentence that could result from a trial
conviction.18 9 In the federal system, the Sentencing Guidelines explicitly
reward cooperation by offering "acceptance of responsibility" and
"substantial assistance" credits that reduce the defendant's sentencing
liability if he provides information helpful to prosecutors about other
prospective defendants.190 Prosecutors hold nearly unilateral discretion' 91 in
choosing charges, and that choice in turn determines minimum sentences.19 2
181. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (noting that "plea bargains have become
... central to the administration of the criminal justice system"); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388
(2012) (noting that 97% of federal convictions and 94% of state convictions result in guilty pleas); see
also Hessick, supra note 26, at 1070 n.5 (citations omitted) (citing federal and state rates on plea
bargaining). For a discussion of the duty of counsel to negotiate pleas in capital cases, see Russell
Stetler, Commentary on Counsel's Duty to Seek and Negotiate a Disposition in Capital Cases, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1157 (2003).
182. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
183. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
184. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410-11; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386.
185. Gerald E. Lynch, Frye andLafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 42 (2012).
186. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407; see also Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
187. Lynch, supra note 185, at 40.
188. Id. at 41.
189. Id.
190. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2011); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2013); see
also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2485-86
(2004) (noting that "[t]he Federal Sentencing Guidelines have put a huge premium on another plea-
bargaining technique: cooperating with the government").
191. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and Misconduct, 23 CRIM.
JUST. 24, 25-26 (2008-2009).
192. Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds-The Center
Doesn't, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1386 (2008).
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Prosecutors then decide how much sentencing credit to recommend. I"
The deeply entrenched dependence on plea bargaining, which is
premised on bartering reductions of "going" sentencing rates, to resolve the
vast majority of cases poses an essential challenge for the prospect of
individualized punishment.194  It may be, in fact, that making mitigation
central to noncapital sentencing requires an upending of the current
approach to plea bargaining and reimagining prosecutorial discretion
altogether' 9 -but that revolution does not appear in the immediate offing,
which is the reason the focus of this paper is on the means immediately
available to defense lawyers to erode barriers to more mitigation-centered
noncapital sentencing.
The way plea bargaining works now-including prosecutors'
nearly unfettered power in charging, negotiating, and recommending
sentencesl96-only underscores the importance of mitigation in noncapital
pled cases, where the audience for mitigation needs to be as much the
prosecutor as it does the sentencing court.197 In pled cases, the timing of
investigating and presenting mitigation may be compressed as compared to
tried cases, particularly where post-trial sentencing takes place at a hearing
weeks or months after conviction.' 9 It may mean that the social history
investigation and the involvement of any experts who will help counsel
determine the impact of available mitigation must take place prior to the
plea negotiations, and ideally before a prosecutor decides which charges to
bring. As noted, once a particular charge attaches, there is enormous
incentive for prosecutors to recommend a sentence within a uniform range.
Regardless of its timing, a defense mitigation presentation should play a
central role in the negotiation influencing a prosecutor's decision whether to
settle a case and by what terms. The practice guidelines for defense counsel
in noncapital cases buttress the point and cast it in terms of professional
193. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Shadow of Advisory Guidelines and
Mandatory Minimums, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 377, 380 (2010).
194. See Nancy Gertner, From "Rites" to "Rights": The Decline of the Criminal Jury Trial, 24
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 433, 436 (2012) (recognizing that plea bargaining has caused "many aspects of the
criminal justice system" to suffer, including "meaningful discovery" and "the jury trial").
195. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 193 (suggesting prosecutors develop policies, in the post-
Booker era, which ensure that prosecutorial discretion is exercised "in ways that are fair, rational, and
consistently based on the principles of punishment").
196. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARv. L. REv. 2548, 2558 (2004) (stating that prosecutors possess much more power and opportunity to
dictate outcomes of plea bargaining than defense attorneys); see also AMSTERDAM, supra note 117, at
353-54. (describing the kinds of sentencing recommendations prosecutors can make and of conditional
versus unconditional pleas); see also Barkow, supra note 19, at 1153 (acknowledging that the structure
of federal and state criminal codes add to "the likelihood of discriminatory application of sentencing in
noncapital cases").
197. One federal public defender I spoke with went as far as saying that given how seldom
federal cases proceed to trial, he and his colleagues should be considered "mitigation specialists"
themselves, because most of their advocacy goes to leniency after a plea.
198. Gertner, supra note 194, at 436.
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responsibility.199 In fact, the Supreme Court has said explicitly that in pled
cases, any dereliction of this professional duty that results in an increased
prison sentence for a client has constitutional implications.2 00
Moreover, to the extent that prosecutors are repeat actors in
criminal cases in a given jurisdiction and feel compelled to "treat like cases
alike" based on charges or alleged conduct, zealous advocacy requires
defense lawyers set their clients apart from others accused of similar
offenses by presenting evidence of the client's unique vulnerabilities,
comparatively diminished relative culpability, prospects for rehabilitation
or a productive life outside of prison, and any other mitigating factors. This
lies at the heart of the duty to present an individualized sentencing portrait
to the person with the most power over the disposition, which in pled cases
is, de facto, the prosecutor.
The challenge will be for over-worked and under-funded defense
lawyers to adopt these practices in the cases where their clients intend to
plead. Aside from defense resource constraints, changing prevailing plea
bargaining practices and expectations among the defense bar, prosecutors,
and judges in any given jurisdiction will require a number of fundamental
changes beyond the scope of this paper, beginning with a significant
reduction in cases prosecuted. Still, a concerted defense effort to begin
raising standards and laying a course for more rigorous mitigation
investigation in noncapital cases resolved by plea is a critical starting point
for working mitigation into the largest category of criminal cases. 201
C. Death Is Different
The most fundamental doctrinal impediment to more routine,
rigorous mitigation in noncapital sentencing is the Supreme Court's as-yet
unwavering position that "death is different." 202 There is no constitutional
199. NLADA Guidelines, supra note 121, at §§ 8.1(a)(1), 8.2(c)(1); cf DEFENSE FUNCTION
STANDARDS, supra note 107, at § 4-6.2 (where the ABA Guidelines are again far less specific than the
corresponding NLADA Guidelines).
200. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012) ("[Ilneffective assistance of counsel
during a sentencing hearing can result in Strickland prejudice because any amount of additional jail time
has Sixth Amendment significance.") (internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted); see also
Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-204 (2001) ("[O]ur jurisprudence suggests that any amount
of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.").
201. Raising the bar of criminal practice can be brought about either through the work of trial
attorneys who adopt more rigorous practices and turn those practices into the prevailing norm, or by
habeas challenges to a particular lawyer's performance which a court may use as an occasion to clarify
the baseline for competent practice. Habeas challenges to ineffective assistance of counsel during plea
bargaining will be difficult to prove because of the off-the-record nature of plea negotiations and the
paucity of appeals following voluntarily accepted pleas. For that reason, as well as the difficulty of
proving prejudice in pled cases, some have argued that even if the Supreme Court were to recognize
heightened professional norms applicable to noncapital sentencing, they would not benefit most
noncapital defendants, particularly those who choose to plead. See Steiker & Steiker, Opening a
Window, supra note 11, at 199-200.
202. Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Diferent Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2
OHtO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 117 n.1 (2004) (chronologically tracking development of the Supreme Court's
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right to individualized noncapital sentencing, and therefore no
corresponding requirement that the defendant's life circumstances be
investigated, presented, or considered before punishment is handed down in
a noncapital case.203 As Professor Rachel Barkow has written, however,
"The Court's decisions prohibiting arbitrariness, requiring
individualization, and ensuring proportionality are grounded in the Eighth
Amendment, which prohibits the infliction of 'cruel and unusual
punishments.' There is no hint in the text itself that these terms should
mean one thing in capital cases and another in noncapital cases."1204 The
death penalty certainly benights the rest of our criminal justice system. Yet,
as long as it remains available, it is different in its irreversibility and
finality;205 every safeguard against its infliction is justified and many should
be expanded.2 0 6  However, the fact remains that the vast majority of
criminal defendants are in prison for noncapital crimes, and many are facing
staggering prison terms. As long as there is no Eighth Amendment
requirement of individualized noncapital sentencing, challenges to
noncapital sentences' proportionality are unlikely to succeed, and there is
no basis for a finding of Sixth Amendment Strickland prejudice when a trial
lawyer fails to investigate or present mitigation at noncapital sentencing.
Though mitigation is crucial to any meaningful shift toward
individualized sentencing-because it will require courts to slow down and
learn about the people they are punishing, shed light on the root causes of
crime, ideally influence a reconsideration of lengthy incarceration in many
individual cases and, in the long-term, across cases-doctrinally there is no
Sixth or Eighth Amendment requirement that lawyers present or that courts
consider noncapital mitigation. Moreover, the different structures of capital
and noncapital sentencing proceedings make it such that most noncapital
habeas claims challenging counsel's effectiveness refer to guilt rather than
penalty. In addition, though the Supreme Court has held that there is a
"death-is-different" doctrine).
203. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 956, 994-95 (1991).
204. Barkow, supra note 19, at 1163. Also see Haney, Social Context, supra note 5, at 603-04
for the following support:
Despite the tension that social history evidence creates in the operation of the
system of death sentencing, the opportunity to find and present such evidence is
now constitutionally mandated. The principle that a sentencer's 'possession of
the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life . . .' is essential to
the selection of the appropriate penalty predates the modem era of capital
jurisprudence and has never been restricted exclusively to death penalty cases. It
was embraced and reaffirmed both before and after Lockett, the case generally
identified as having given rise to this requirement in contemporary capital
litigation.
205. But see Barkow, supra note 19, at 1167-74 (arguing that death is not uniquely severe or
final); Id. at 1201 (advocating for limiting the types of mitigation that may be presented in capital cases
as one strategy for bringing uniformity to noncapital and capital sentencing). This is a position I cannot
agree with given the qualitative difference between state-imposed execution and a long prison term,
which undoubtedly is a taking of a different kind, but not one that extinguishes a life. In prison, there is
always a chance of redemption, rehabilitation, or release.
206. Steiker & Steiker, Opening a Window, supra note 11, at 157-59.
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single Sixth Amendment standard for judging attorney effectiveness, it has
enforced that standard more robustly in capital than in noncapital cases.2 07
The structural differences between capital and noncapital sentencing make
it difficult to apply the Supreme Court's capital ineffectiveness doctrine
squarely to noncapital sentencing.20 8
First, capital defendants are nearly always sentenced by juries
rather than judges.209 Although there are jurisdictions with noncapital jury
sentencing, most noncapital sentences are imposed by judges.2 10 Much has
been written about the different approaches to sentencing taken by juries as
compared to judges. 2 11 Judges are more likely to want to treat like cases
alike and maintain some semblance of uniformity in sentencing. They are
also professional sentencers, as opposed to juries who are generally making
a single sentencing decision and are therefore less likely than judges to
suffer from "compassion fatigue" after hearing day in and day out tales of
poverty, trauma, and mental illness. 2 12 However, more comprehensive
mitigation at noncapital sentencing may upend the idea that judges are
bound to treat cases that may appear at first blush to be alike when the focus
is only on the offense. As for compassion fatigue, the precise challenge is
to present facts that persuade the sentencer that no matter how many stories
he has heard before, this defendant is both worthy of leniency and capable
of redemption. If capital litigation has demonstrated anything, it is that
mitigation, even in cases involving the most serious crimes, has the power
to convince the sentencing court that viewing a defendant's actions during a
particular criminal offense in isolation and at face value is not a just basis
for fixing punishment.213 Cases that may appear to be alike may not be
alike at all, and the defense lawyer's role is to set her client apart and
provide a basis for mercy before a court accustomed to routinely handing
down prison terms without much information about the people being sent to
207. As discussed above, nearly all the Supreme Court precedent on the effective assistance of
counsel during sentencing has been decided in capital cases and depends on the bifurcated capital
proceedings in which sentencing is its own phase of trial, presided over by a jury required to consider
mitigating evidence. See Hessick, supra note 26, at 1071, 1071 n.8 (citing Eva S. Nilsen, Decency,
Dignity and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Human Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 11l, 152 (2007) (characterizing the Supreme Court's noncapital sentencing jurisprudence as a
"virtual blank check" to legislatures)). See also Steiker & Steiker, Opening a Window, supra note 11, at
190-91.
208. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 11, at 198-99.
209. See Douglas A. Berman, Examining the Blakely Earthquake and Its Aftershocks, 16 FED.
SENT'G REP. 307 (2004).
210. Barkow, supra note 19, at 1153; Hessick, supra note 26, at 1095.
211. See, e.g., Nancy King, How Different Is Death? Jury Sentencing In Capital and Non-
Capital Cases Compared, 2 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 195 (2004); Morris B. Hoffman, The Case For Jury
Sentencing, 52 DuKE L.J. 951 (2003); Lanni, supra note 103.
212. See Dianne Molvig, The Toll of Trauma, 84-DEC. Wisc. LAW. 4, 8 (2011) (stating that
judges are among those affected by compassion fatigue).
213. See Lanni, supra note 103, at 1778 (contrasting "just deserts" sentencing, which focuses on
the nature of the crime, with rehabilitative sentencing, which looks more at the individual characteristics
of the offender).
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prison.214
For state cases, the role of elected judges complicates the picture.
The perception of judicial leniency has cost some judges their seats and
electoral pressures therefore promote a tendency to be "tough on crime" in
all but the most unusual cases. 215 There is no easy answer to this other than
to use zealous defense sentencing practices to shift both the expectations of
courts and the punishment baselines over time so that the touchstone of
harshness or leniency becomes less draconian. Moreover, studies have
shown that lay people are actually less punitive than judges when presented
with detailed information about particular people convicted of crimes.2 16 If
the discourse around crime moves from the offense to the provision of more
data about the person accused or convicted of the offense, the seemingly
bottomless appetite for harsh punishment may abate.
Judicial sentencing in noncapital cases also has implications for
appellate review or reconsideration of sentences. Unlike in capital cases, a
court examining a Sixth Amendment challenge to counsel's performance in
a noncapital case will not determine the probability that a juror would have
decided differently in light of the new evidence, which is a question
requiring judges to substitute their own judgment for that of a reasonable
juror. Rather, challenges to defense counsel's performance during judge-
imposed sentencing will require judges to consider whether a reasonable
judge would have found a particular set of mitigating circumstances
persuasive enough to have imposed a less punitive sentence. 2 17  That may
pose a formidable obstacle to habeas challenges to noncapital sentences for
some time, particularly when federal courts are reviewing state court
judgments.2 18  However, this also presents another opportunity to educate
214. A United States Sentencing Commission survey of federal judges reveals that although
some judges believe that factors such as "mental condition" and "disadvantaged upbringing" are
relevant to sentencing within the guidelines-and, in some instances, to whether to grant a downward
variance from the guidelines range-these factors are less relevant in most judges' view than is evidence
of rehabilitation. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010, 18 (2010),
http://www.ussc.gov/Research-andStatistics/ResearchProjects/Surveys/20100608_JudgeSurvey.pdf.
This bolsters the conclusion that more must be done to expose judges to life history mitigation and to
persuade them of its salience. Of course someone's mental condition or social disadvantage will affect
his ability to improve his life and will define the starting point from which he must travel before he is
considered truly rehabilitated. In other words, it is impossible to evaluate prospects for rehabilitation
apart from a defendant's social context.
215. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Why Habeas Review ofState Court Convictions Is
More Important than Ever, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 4 (2012) (discussing how state judicial elections
influence decisions in criminal cases); see also Haney, War on Prisoners, supra note 23, at 400
(explaining that the penal process became "politicized" and the judiciary "became a convenient symbol
for criminal justice system-related frustrations"); cf Lanni, supra note 103, at 1782 (describing the
similar effect of electoral pressures on politicians and legislators).
216. Lanni, supra note 103, at 1780.
217. The appellate courts must determine whether the sentence is reasonable by applying
sentencing factors enumerated by Congress. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005).
218. See Adelman & Dietrich, supra note 215 (discussing the importance of habeas review of
state court convictions).
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judges through repeated exposure to mitigation and serves as another
compelling reason for defense lawyers to expand and routinize the
presentation of life history mitigation in noncapital sentencing proceedings.
Another way in which death is different is that capital cases are
bifurcated, and sentencing is a stage of trial over which the jury presides
and at which the prosecution and the defense generally present live
witnesses. Structurally, it is more formal and anticipates a good deal more
evidence than is usually involved in noncapital judge sentencing, though
contemporary noncapital sentencing more often than not does involve
advocacy from both sides.219
In addition, a capital sentence can never be mandatory, 220 while in
noncapital sentencing-beginning in the late 1970s in response to criticisms
about discretionary sentencing leading to inconsistent, racially biased
punishment22 '-both federal and state criminal statutes moved toward
uniform determinate and mandatory sentencing, with an explicit departure
from individualization. 2 22  Strong arguments pointing to wide sentencing
disparities in pre-Guidelines systems support uniformity, treating like cases
alike, and reducing the risk of individual sentencing bias-particularly
racial bias. These arguments favor determinate, offense-based punishment
and suggest that a return to individualization runs the risk of a return to
inconsistency in punishment, where the least advantaged are the most likely
to face the harshest penalties. One response to this argument is that the pre-
Guidelines era of individualized punishment mostly pre-dated the
developments in capital mitigation, described supra Part III, that form the
basis of the recommendation that noncapital mitigation follow a similar
trajectory. In other words, we do not actually know what noncapital
individualization-a type based on meaningful mitigation investigation
aimed at identifying human frailty and explaining law-breaking behavior-
looks like or how it works because that practice has not taken hold on a
wide scale outside capital cases.
In any event, determinate and mandatory punishment regimes
introduced a seismic shift in criminal sentencing that eschewed
219. See Hessick, supra note 26, at 1080 (discussing the changing role of counsel at the
sentencing phase).
220. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (holding Louisiana's mandatory death
sentence statute unconstitutional); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding North
Carolina's mandatory death sentence statute unconstitutional).
221. Dharmapala et al., supra note 23, at 1040, 1044.
222. See Haney, War on Prisoners, supra note 23, at 377-86 (discussing the emergence of
determinate sentencing and abandonment of rehabilitative, individualized sentencing); Dharmapala et
al., supra note 23, at 1043-44. Uniformity was also paramount to the Furman decision striking down
capital punishment as being inconsistently imposed. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972).
Furman then gave way to Gregg's "guided discretion," which relies on juries' consideration of
individualized mitigating and aggravating factors. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976).
Meanwhile, uniformity in noncapital sentencing remains robust, likely because of legislatures'
perception that judges, as professional repeat actors, can more easily be relied on to impose uniform
sentences.
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rehabilitation in favor of offense-centered, "just deserts" punishments that
have dramatically increased the number and length of prison sentences
courts have imposed in the last four decades. 22 3 In fact, the Supreme Court
has upheld the application of mandatory noncapital sentences, even for life
without the possibility of parole. 22 4 At the same time, the only context in
which the Supreme Court has held that a noncapital defense lawyer's
sentencing failure has resulted in prejudice, thus violating the Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, has been that of a
mandatory sentence resulting in a significantly harsher penalty than would
have resulted absent counsel's calculation error.225 In the years since that
case was decided, the Supreme Court has curtailed mandatory sentencing,
in cases such as United States v. Booker, and has required prosecution
teams to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of any sentencing
factor besides a prior conviction that can increase a sentence beyond the
statutory maximum. 226  Additionally, as described supra Part III.C.,
Miller/Jackson provides another opening for a return to individualized
sentencing.227
Despite these decisions pushing back against mandatory
determinate sentencing, absent consideration of individual offenders'
characteristics, uniformity and just deserts remain the dominant punishment
paradigm within which noncapital mitigation practice operates for the time
being.228 One might argue that-particularly because uniform sentencing
schemes are almost exclusively offense-centered 229 -- determinate
sentencing is an obstacle to the investigation and presentation of social
history mitigation since judges must impose a sentence within a particular
range, often with mandatory minimumS 23 0 in the federal system as well as in
many states,231 upon conviction of certain crimes.2 32 In fact, the opposite is
true. In mandatory sentencing regimes, it is all the more imperative that
223. Haney, War on Prisoners, supra note 23, at 391.
224. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 956, 996 (1991).
225. See Hessick, supra note 26, at 1081-82 (discussing Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198,
203-04 (2001)).
226. See Hessick, supra note 26, at 1082-85 (discussing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
303 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2003); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 490-92 (2000)).
227. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
228. Haney, War on Prisoners, supra note 23, at 410.
229. Id. at 394.
230. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 93, 105 (2007) (noting the lower
court's disapproval of the disproportionate limitations on sentencing under the Guidelines and
discussing in detail the disproportionality between Guidelines sentences for trafficking crack cocaine
and for trafficking powder cocaine).
231. See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 35, at 69.
232. See Lanni, supra note 103, at 1783, 1785 ("[T]he Federal [Sentencing] Guidelines severely
curtail judicial discretion by declaring 'not ordinarily relevant' many personal characteristics of the
offender previously considered by sentencing judges, such as . . . mental and emotional conditions,
socioeconomic status, and 'lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a
disadvantaged upbringing."') (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H 1.1, 3, 5, 6, 10,
12(1998)).
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defense lawyers present whatever credible evidence is available to persuade
prosecutors to adjust their charging decisions to avoid conviction for
offenses involving lengthy mandatory sentences. 233 Defense attorneys must
also present courts with persuasive reasons to either depart from the
Sentencing Guidelines or sentence their clients to the lower end of the
mandatory range.
Rita v. United States is an example of both the availability and the
limits of an individualized sentencing presentation within a Guidelines-
reliant system.234 Rita, a U.S. military veteran who had served as a
cooperating law enforcement witness in other cases, faced sentencing for
making false statements to a federal grand jury. 235  The probation
department, with the help of the defense and the prosecution, produced a
presentence report that considered both "the offenses and . . . the
offender," 236 including "Rita's personal and family data, Rita's physical
condition (including a detailed description of ailments), Rita's mental and
emotional health," as well as his educational background and his twenty-
five years of military service. 237  The presentence report cited no
circumstances that warranted departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. 238
Rita's lawyer agreed with the judge's identification at sentencing of two
factors warranting departure from the Guidelines: Rita's cooperation with
law enforcement, which made him a "vulnerable defendant" in prison, and
his military service. 239 Defense counsel presented Rita's "poor physical
condition" as a third reason and argued that "[j]ust [those] three special
circumstances" warranted a below-Guidelines sentence. 240 The court was
not persuaded and sentenced Rita to thirty-three months in prison, the
bottom of the Guidelines range.241 As Justice Stevens suggested in his
concurrence, however, even though aspects of Rita's personal history were
introduced at his sentencing, the Guidelines did not allow for their
meaningful consideration. 242 In particular, the Guidelines did not account
for the "significant recognition" Rita received for his military service, and
neither did the sentencing court. 243 Rita illustrates the mechanical, actuarial
233. See Lanni, supra note 103, at 1786 ("[Dleterminate sentencing merely shifts power and
discretion from the sentencing judge to prosecutors and probation officers . . . ."); Richman, supra note
192, at 1386 ("With substantial control over the flow of offense-related facts to the judge, and even over
the investment of resources in the discovery of facts to begin with, prosecutors were left with
unprecedented sway over sentencing.").
234. 551 U.S. 338, 338 (2007) (holding that a federal court of appeals may apply a presumption
of reasonableness to a district court sentence that is within the properly calculated Federal Sentencing
Guidelines range).
235. Id. at 341, 345.
236. Id. at 342.
237. Id. at 343-44.
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239. Id. at 344-45.
240. Id. at 345 (alteration in original).
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approach to "individualized" sentencing presentations under a Guidelines-
based regime.2 " Rita's lawyer presented "just those three" special
circumstances. The Court made no mention of any comprehensive social
history or narrative describing who Rita was or any convincing presentation
of what pressures, incentives, or medical conditions may have influenced
his behavior. The sentencing court was apparently expected to look at three
discrete categories of mitigating information and decide, simply because
they could be checked off a list, that Rita deserved a lower sentence. Such
a sentencing presentation in a capital case would fall short of accepted
defense standards where, at minimum, "connecting the dots" of mitigating
factors and explaining their impact on the defendant's behavior is basic and
critical to a persuasive sentencing. 245 In fact, capital mitigation is almost
universally aimed at showing how a defendant's multi-dimensional life
does not conform to a grid of the sort that Guidelines-based sentences
depend on.
Rita shows that, even post-Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines cast a
long shadow over federal sentencing and remain a hurdle to a truly
comprehensive consideration of social history mitigation. Rita further
demonstrates that defense lawyers whose practice continues to be limited
by the strictures of the "relevant" Guidelines considerations will fail to do
their clients justice.24 6
In many ways, mandatory regimes present the same binary question
that capital proceedings do: Has the defendant's conduct fallen in the range
requiring application of particular sentencing reductions or
enhancements? 247 This determination requires prevailing on the decision-
maker's sense that the particular defendant standing before her is less
blameworthy than another convicted of the same offense. At its base, all
sentencing is subjective and defense lawyers must routinely investigate
their clients' life histories and determine which factors are most likely to
inspire mercy. This paper calls for a move away from the crime-focused,
decontextualized, heavily retributive sentences that determinate schemes
require, 248 and a move toward a more rehabilitative, individualized
approach to punishment that depends on meaningful consideration of
mitigating circumstances. Over time, the persistent presentation of
244. Cf Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 58 (2007). Gall describes a district court's departure
from the Guidelines and imposition of probation following a conviction for conspiracy to distribute
10,000 ecstasy pills following the presentation of a substantial amount of evidence of Gall's immaturity
at the time of the offense and subsequent rehabilitation and years of legitimate employment. Id. at 41-
43.
245. Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 AKRON L. REV.
331, 357-58 (1979), cited with approval in Russell Stetler & W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA Guidelines
and the Norms of Capital Defense Representation, 41 HOFSTRA L. REv. 635, 672 n.189 (2013).
246. See generally Rita, 551 U.S. at 347 (discussing a presumption of reasonableness when the
trial court follows the Sentencing Guidelines range).
247. Hessick, supra note 26, at 1089.
248. See Lanni, supra note 103, at 1787 (noting recent academic critique of determinate
sentencing and the need for an individualized approach to sentencing).
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noncapital mitigation may erode support for mandatory sentencing
altogether as defense lawyers, prosecutors, and courts realize that individual
life circumstances and characteristics matter and there is no one-size-fits-all
approach to punishment.2 49
With regard to non-mandatory sentencing, Professor Carissa Byrne
Hessick has urged further development of noncapital professional norms
and substantive case law governing discretionary noncapital sentencing.25 0
Professor Hessick has argued that, in many ways, noncapital discretionary
sentencing is not unlike capital sentencing; and, therefore, Sixth
Amendment claims challenging the sentencing performance of defense
counsel should only have to prove a reasonable probability that the
defendant's sentence was increased by any amount of actual jail time.251
However, the relatively broad standards for the type of mitigation defense
lawyers need to investigate in noncapital cases presents a challenge in
proving ineffective assistance during discretionary noncapital sentencing.252
Professor Hessick suggests that constitutionally required investigation of
capital mitigation may provide a foundation for noncapital cases, 253 but the
"death is different" doctrine again proves to be a formidable hurdle here
since there is no Sixth Amendment requirement that mitigation be presented
in a noncapital case. As Professor Hessick recognizes, the baseline
requirements of the types of mitigation that must be investigated have been
far better developed in the capital context. 254
The Supreme Court's longstanding Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, and the practical reality that death remains unique in its
irreversibility and in its degree of cruelty, requires the conclusion that death
is different (for the time being). Development of capital judicial decisions
and defense practices is impossible to divorce from this context. There is
almost no comparable noncapital case law and, as discussed previously, the
noncapital sentencing professional standards, while providing an outline of
basic duties, pale in comparison to the capital guidelines. 25 5
In light of the comparatively general noncapital professional
standards and a lack of substantive case law establishing a top-down
constitutional duty to investigate and present noncapital mitigation, the
most immediate avenue for improving noncapital defense sentencing
baselines remains changing defense lawyers' actual standard of practice in
everyday cases. This is the best hope for changing the expectations of
courts (both in sentencing and habeas proceedings), prosecutors, and clients
249. See Barkow, supra note 19, at 1205 (advocating for uniform capital and noncapital
sentencing standards in order to prohibit mandatory noncapital sentencing, which would "make a
dramatic difference for thousands upon thousands of defendants serving [mandatory] sentences").
250. Hessick, supra note 26, at 1111-12, 1121-22.
251. Id. at 1087, 1090.
252. Id. at 106-07.
253. Id.atll07-09.
254. Id. at 1107.
255. Id. atI 110.
84 [Vol. 41:1
2013] Making Mitigation the Heart of Noncapital Sentencing
about what basic and competent noncapital sentencing advocacy requires,
and for ensuring that noncapital sentencing courts moderate sentences and
account not only for the facts of the offense, but also for the unique
individual frailties of the offender. 25 6
VI. Conclusion
Individualized noncapital sentencing appears to be resurging and its
expansion will have an impact on incarceration rates. The Supreme Court's
recent emphasis that the background of a convicted person is as important
as the crime itself should serve as a clarion call for institutional change.
Though resource and doctrinal constraints present challenges to a full
reconciliation of capital and noncapital mitigation practice, a good deal of
change can begin immediately by reorienting defense lawyers to take
mitigation as seriously in noncapital cases as capital defense lawyers do,
and to realign their practices and professional standards accordingly.
Making mitigation central to noncapital sentencing will benefit
individual defendants by reducing prison time and will simultaneously
result in more systemic reform, which sheds light on root causes of crime
by explaining factors that actually influence defendants' behavior before
they break the law. Routine and robust noncapital mitigation presentations
will also change sentencing courts' expectations of sentencing practice and
increase the eventual likelihood of a new constitutional baseline for
mandatory noncapital sentencing mitigation as there has been for decades in
capital cases.
Finally, I will end on a grace note-one played out in a noncapital
case which, like scores of cases all over the country, is by most measures
unremarkable to anyone but the defendant, who was spared prison, and her
family. The court that sentenced the defendant allowed for hope and the
possibility of a successful future because it paused to consider the range of
circumstances that influenced her behavior. This case also speaks to the
reality of many defendants' life courses, which often include relapses into
criminal involvement rather than an undeviating line to immediate
redemption.
In 2002, Chastity Hawkins, a young woman from the South Bronx
with no prior criminal record, pled guilty to federal fraud charges stemming
from participation in the "family business," 257 led by her father, which
256. See Steiker & Steiker, Entrenchment, supra note 7, at 239 (discussing the
professionalization and improved practice of the capital defense bar as contributing to the greater
scrutiny of capital sentences). Successful habeas challenges to defense sentencing failures can provide a
wider-reaching doctrinal foundation for improved sentencing representation in noncapital cases as they
have in capital cases, so it is also important to consider bringing these challenges in cases with strong
facts. Yet another significant challenge to more robust noncapital habeas practice is the fact that
noncapital prisoners, unlike death row prisoners, have no statutory right to counsel in federal habeas.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a) (statute granting death row prisoners the right to counsel in federal habeas
proceedings).
257. United States v. Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 143, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), af'd, 228 Fed.
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involved defrauding insurance companies by staging car accidents and then
"initiating false legal and medical claims based on fabricated injuries."2 58
Hawkins' conviction exposed her to a $148,814 restitution charge and a 12-
to-18-month prison sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.2 59
Defense counsel moved for a downward departure on the grounds of
extraordinary family circumstances and extraordinary rehabilitation, based
in part on her being a young mother, though Hawkins herself admitted "she
was not a great mother .. ."260 During this initial proceeding, "the court . .
. [nevertheless] had a strong impression that [Hawkins] . . . may have
bottomed out, that is reached the end of her difficulties, and that she was
coming back into useful society." 261  Based on this assessment, the court
granted a year-long supervised adjournment of sentencing so that Hawkins
could have "a chance to show full rehabilitation." 262 Yet within that year,
she continued to commit fraud, this time by falsely certifying she was not
working while simultaneously collecting unemployment checks. 26 3 At the
end of the probation, the court nevertheless took into account the progress
Hawkins had made in legitimate employment as well as in her relationship
with her daughter and determined that she had demonstrated "extraordinary
rehabilitation"-a formal downward departure under the Sentencing
Guidelines. The court sentenced her to three years of probation and full
restitution. 264
The case was remanded after the government's post-sentencing
appeal challenging the conclusion that Hawkins had been rehabilitated.
During remand, Hawkins' attorney submitted a motion for downward
departure as well as for a non-Guidelines sentence, 265 and the district court
held a hearing on evidence of extraordinary rehabilitation. The hearing
provided an unusually detailed record explaining a noncapital sentencing
court's sentencing considerations. The defense motion argued extensively
that Hawkins deserved a non-incarceration sentence because of her
successful employment, attainment of a GED, and general stabilization of
her life.26 6 The motion also described the importance of Hawkins' support
of her nine-year-old daughter.2 6 7 It also referred to Hawkins' diminished
relative culpability and "truly extraordinary" transformation "[w]hen




261. Id. at 162.
262. Id. at 166.
263. Id at 169.
264. Id. at 167.
265. Motion for Downward Departure at 8-9, United States v. Hawkins, No. 1:02-CR-563-JBW
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), ECF No. 358.
266. Id. at 4-5.
267. Id. at 4, 6. Previously, Ms. Hawkins' daughter had been in court with her and had
impressed the court with her straight-A report card. Transcript of Sentencing Record at 4, United States
v. Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 02-CR-563).
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considered in the context of her past life and resources, or lack thereof."268
During the evidentiary hearing, Hawkins testified that before her arrest, she
was mainly receiving help from public assistance and her father when she
was not working. She also reported that she partied every week, spent a lot
of time shopping, and had not been a good mother.269 By contrast, Hawkins
testified that after her arrest she developed a much better relationship with
her daughter 270 and that her marriage to her daughter's father (who
remained incarcerated as he had been almost since the child's birth) had
brought the family closer together. 271 She also testified to an improved
work ethic and to developing employment skills. 27 2 Hawkins also attested
that she did not know who would care for her daughter if she were
incarcerated. The government nevertheless argued in support of the 12-to-
18-month maximum prison sentence and cited, among other reasons,
Hawkins' fraud during the pre-sentencing adjournment and Hawkins' lies to
a probation officer about being fired from a job for impermissibly cashing
checks. 273
The court concluded at the end of the hearing that Hawkins had,
despite occasional missteps, indeed exhibited extraordinary rehabilitation.
This required a view of Hawkins' behavior in the context of her family and
social history: "A rehabilitative design takes into account the fact that a
person's actions may reflect genetics, social advantage, and deprivation as
well as free will, merit, and culpability . . . . Pure retribution, or 'just
deserts,' ignores the handicapping effect of social, economic, and natural
deprivation." 27 4  As to Hawkins' particular deprivations, the court
considered her "dysfunctional" family history significant. 275 Her crimes,
after all, had been at the behest of her father, and both her parents were
"career criminals" who had spearheaded the instant conspiracy. 276 Her
father was "an alcoholic . . . who used his position of power in the
268. Motion for Downward Departure at 6-7, United States v. Hawkins, No. 102-CR-563-JBW
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), ECF No. 358.
269. Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 170-71.
270. Id. at 171.
271. Id
272. Id.
273. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, United States v.
Hawkins, No. 102-CR-563-JBW (E.D.N.Y. 2005), ECF No. 369.
274. Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 150-51. The court quoted Jonathan Kozol's Amazing Grace, a
book about the extreme poverty blighting the communities in New York City from which nearly three
quarters of New York state prisoners hail. Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 151 (citing JONATHAN
KOZOL, AMAZING GRACE 3-5 (Perennial ed. 2000)). During a lengthy analysis of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, the court rejected the government's rather perverse argument that someone with
a relatively law-abiding life who engages in low-level criminal conduct cannot benefit from the
extraordinary rehabilitation departure because her conduct was never so bad as to warrant any
extraordinary rehabilitation. Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59.
275. Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 172. Ms. Hawkins' attorney had referred in the Motion for
Downward Departure to her father's role in introducing her to fraudulent activity. Motion for
Downward Departure, supra note 268, at 8.
276. Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
87
AM. J. CRIM. L.
household to pressure other members into illegal conduct." 27 7 The court
gave great shrift to Hawkins' efforts to educate and train herself in skills
that had allowed her to maintain legitimate, gainful employment. 27 8 Finally,
the court described the circumstances of Hawkins' dropping out of high
school in eleventh grade:
[Hawkins was] attack[ed] by a twenty-five year old stranger who
threw acid on her face . . . [which] caused extensive facial
scarring that is still visible in the form of welts across her face
and neck. She was reluctant to be seen in public for a year
following this attack, which was a contributing factor to her
leaving school.279
It is not difficult to imagine this extraordinary interruption of
opportunity alone inspiring the court's empathy. The court also took into
great account Hawkins' evolving relationship with her daughter and that
she had done "what was reasonably within her power to normalize her
daughter's life." 2 80
In addressing Hawkins' missteps while her sentencing was pending,
the court concluded, with empathy tempered by years of practical
observation, that when defendants are "emerging from troubled or criminal
circumstances, backsliding is not an uncommon occurrence."281 In the end,
the court concluded that, after some setbacks, Hawkins was building a
"law-abiding lifestyle" 282 and that probation was the only viable sentence,
as any term of incarceration would not account for Hawkins' rehabilitation
and "would have a disastrous effect on [Hawkins'] daughter, a matter of
importance in sentencing jurisprudence." 28 3
The unmistakable impact of social history mitigation was fully
evident as the court considered the young woman's conduct and future
prospects:
A child forced into crime by a criminal father surely emerges
from a different starting point than the child of a legitimately
employed parent . . . . Defendant's background reflected social
as well as socioeconomic deprivation-a scarred personality as
well as an acid-etched visage. That she has progressed from an
irresponsible white collar criminal to a law-abiding hard working
277. Id. at 172.
278. Id at 164.
279. Id at 172-73. The Motion for Downward Departure had also mentioned the acid attack.
Motion for Downward Departure, supra note 268, at 5. Ms. Hawkins had also testified about the attack
and about its impact on her ability and willingness to go out in public, including the fact that she was
hospitalized for three months because of her injuries. Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
280. Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 175.
281. Id. at 176.
282. Id. at 177-78.
283. Id. at 178.
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citizen is quite extraordinary, given this starting point.284
This is the grace note, the pursuit of which is certainly worthy for
more outcomes like this.
284. Id. at 161.
